The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract? by Rieke, Luvern V.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 49 
Number 2 Symposium: Recent Washington 
Legislation 
2-1-1974 
The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract? 
Luvern V. Rieke 
University of Washington School of Law 





 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Luvern V. Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 375 (1974). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol49/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
THE DISSOLUTION ACT OF 1973:
FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT?
Luvern V. Rieke*
On or about February 28, 1854, presumably in Olympia, Washing-
ton, the territorial legislature enacted a measure stating "that marriage
is declared to be a civil contract."' While not denying that ethical and
religious systems may properly characterize marriage differently, the
legislature has continued to refer to the marital relation as a contract.
With the enactment of a new dissolution law, the legislature has given
content to the legal designation it has consistently employed.
Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in
an 1888 divorce case from-the territory of Washington, observed that
"whilst marriage is often termed . . .a civil contract ... it is some-
thing more .... '' He quoted with approval Chief Justice Appleton,
who wrote for the Supreme Court of Maine that "the contracting par-
ties ... have not so much entered a contract as into a new relation,
the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest upon their agreement,
but upon the general law . . . ." Mr. Justice Appleton hinted rather
broadly that marriage really may not be a contract at all, or at most
an extreme form of adhesion contract, and pointed out that the mar-
ital partners cannot modify, change or shorten the "contract" by sub-
sequent agreement. He noted that the "contract" is not within the
meaning of the clause of the Constitution which prohibits the impair-
ment of contractual obligation,3 and then concluded that, rather than
being a contract, marriage is "a social relation, like that of parent and
child,... a relation most important.... the first step from barbarism
to incipient civilization,... the true basis of human progress."
Professor of Law. University of Washington: B.S. 1948, LL.B. 1949, University
of Washington; LL.M. 1953, University of Chicago: LL.D. 1959. Pacific Lutheran
University. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Michael E. Tardif for
assistance rendered in researching this article.
I. [1854] Wash. Sess. Laws 404, § I.
2. Maynard v. Hill. 125 U.S. 190, 210(1888).
3. The Florida Supreme Court recently agreed with this conclusion. The consti-
tutional prohibition of impairment applies only to "those contracts providing certain,
definite and fixed private rights of property which are vested in the contract." Ryan v.
Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1973). The reasoning, however, is not the same as
that of Mr. Justice Appleton. The Florida court insists that marriage is and "for over
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Expectations concerning the contract of marriage have changed
during the last century. The Washington legislature has now said that
if one spouse alleges that "the marriage is irretrievably broken," and
"[i] f the other party joins in the petition or does not deny that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall enter a decree of dis-
solution."'4 Is this a mutual rescission of a contract, leaving only ques-
tions of restitution for the attention of the parties or the court? The
new Dissolution Act also provides that the judge shall enter a decree
of dissolution if the petitioner, after a brief delay and perhaps some
counseling, persists in asserting that the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken, even though the respondent denies the allegation.- To continue
the contract analogy, should such a unilateral demand for dissolution
be viewed simply as a renunciation of future performance? If so,
should the resulting question be whether the renunciation can be justi-
fied by reason of failure of consideration or, alternatively, whether it
is itself a breach of contract? If the analysis is predicated upon con-
tract theory, the performance would be ended and it would remain for
the parties to negotiate, or for the court to decide, upon the ancillary
issues of remedy. The relief to be expected, quite unlike the historical
divorce pattern which often favored negative injunctions precluding
marriage to another and which usually ordered some degree of
specific performance,"; might now emphasize damages or restitution.
All of this has a strange sound to lawyers and judges. Marriage has
been called a contract, but a "breach" usually has been treated as a
tort or a crime. Examples of this anomaly are abundant. For instance,
consider the remedy for what is commonly called a breach of a con-
tract to marry. When damages are not measured by "the natural con-
120 years of Florida Jurisprudence" has been a contract "rather than a mere
.relationship' " as the Ala ynard case suggests.
4. Dissolution Act of 1973. § 3(1). enacted as ch. 157. § 3(l). 119731 Wash.
Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1217. codified as WASH. RI v. CoiD § 26.09.030W1) (Supp. 1973).
5. hi., § 26.09.030(3).
6. Separate maintenance is of course a type of specific performance. The orders
for child support and alimony also resemble equitable orders although in strict term-,
the divorce power is statutory. See Tupper v. Tupper. 63 Wn. 2d 585. 388 P.2d 225
(1964).
7. The normal -loss of profit" or expectation damages might be too speculative to
be helpful in these actions. Perhaps it is time to pay greater attention to antenuptial
contracts (see Friedlander v. Friedlander. 80 Wn. 2d 293. 494 P.2d 208 11972) for a
recent example) or the ordinary liquidated damage clauses. It may also be useful to
consider the emerging contract remedy of restitution. not in the traditional quasi-
contract sense, but in the newer sense of a money judgment designed to put the in-
jured party in the economic position occupied before the contract was entered. See
.I. CxMARl & J. PI R In. CoN IRAC is § 240t1970).
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The Dissolution Act
sequences of the breach" but upon consideration of the "character, the
chastity and social standing... personal feelings and pride.., mental
suffering, the age, wealth ... and motives," one must agree with the
court that " ... we never look upon the relationship as one of contract
in the sense that word is generally used."8 Another example is that the
failure to provide the support promised in marriage is routinely re-
garded as a crime." Finally there has been little in the conflict of laws
rules applicable to marriage and divorce which resembled the rules
applicable to contract cases. Does the Dissolution Act start us on a
new road?
I. NO-FAULT: TERMINATION OF THE STATUS
No-fault divorce is not new and if the Dissolution Act of 1973 were
simply a "no-fault" piece of legislation, Washington would not be
venturing into untested territory. The no-fault label has been used to
refer somewhat indiscriminately to a broad class of divorce legislation.
For example, the exclusive ground for divorce in England, "that the
marriage has broken down irretrievably," cannot be found unless the
petitioner proves at least one of five "facts," any one of which would
constitute grounds for divorce in many jurisdictions of the United
States.' 0 The term also has been used when a new ground has been
inserted among more traditional grounds in an existing divorce act.
8. Warner v. Benham, 126 Wash. 393. 395. 218 P. 260. 261 (1923). There are
many indications that this "'breach of contract" is treated as a tort rather than as a
contract: One cannot effectively mitigate by offer of performance, Heasley v. Nichols.
38 Wash. 485. 80 P. 769; a prior tort action for seduction is at times res judicata of
the subsequent "'contract- action. Rieger v. Abrams, 98 Wash. 72. 167 P. 76 (1917):
there is virtually a presumption of "contract" which arises from illicit conduct even
though there was no "express and specific promise" to marry. Kelly v. Drumheller,
150 Wash. 185. 272 P. 731 (1928): and even the statute of limitations. WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.16.080(7) (1963). is separately stated from the section governing limita-
tion upon contract actions.
9. See WASH. REv. Con)E ch. 26.20 (1963) (family desertion).
10. Divorce Reform Act 1969. c. 55. provides:
2.--( I) The court hearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage
to have broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the court of one
or more of the following facts, that is to say-
(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intol-
erable to live with the respondent:
(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner can-
not reasonably be expected to live with the respondent;
(c) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of
at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;
(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period
377
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Delaware lawyers have described as "no-fault" a divorce granted
because of incompatibility proven "by rift or discord produced by
J .i
reciprocal conflict of personalities existing for 2 consecutive years....
A new act in Iowa is regarded as "no-fault" even though the break-
down of marriage cannot be established by testimony of the petitioner
alone but must be corroborated by others. ' 2
If the "no-fault" acts in other jurisdictions require the court to find
some objective set of facts which proves that the marriage has deterio-
rated too far to be salvaged, one could reasonably contend that the
legislation merely substitutes a new set of facts for the old as
"grounds" for dissolution. The scene of battle may have been changed
but a battle, genuine or contrived, is still demanded. The Dissolution
Act goes beyond such scene shifting. The determination to dissolve a
marriage rests with the spouses, not with the state. The important
question is whether the law can process the termination without gener-
ating needless animosity, bitterness or trauma.
In an attempt to accomplish this goal of dissolution with minimum
hostility, the Dissolution Act makes two basic changes from prior law:
(1) New terminology is used,t 3 and (2) contractual form and the nego-
tiation role of the parties and their counsel are emphasized. The
second change obviously relates to economic interests and child re-
lated problems which will be discussed later. At this point our inquiry
of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and
the respondent consents to a decree being granted:
(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period
of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.
II. DEnI. Con1 ANN. tit. 13. § 1522(12) (Cum. Supp. 1970). The section reads:
When husband and wife are incompatible in that their marriage is characterized
by rift or discord produced by reciprocal conflict of personalities existing for 2
consecutive years prior to the filing of the divorce action, and which has destroyed
their relationship as husband and wife and the reasonable possibility of reconcili-
ation.
The Delaware court has continued to speak of fault although it "should not" do so:
the practical effect has been divorce without recourse to tault. Gallagher. No-Fault
Divorce in Delaware, 59 A.B.A.J. 873. 873-74 (1973).
12. IOWA CODE § 598.10 (Cum. Supp. 1973). The corroborating testimony need
not be sufficient in itself to establish the basis for dissolution. It suffices if it "satisfies
the court from all the evidence presented IthatI (I) there has actually been a break-
down of the relationship and (2) there remains no likelihood the marriage can be
preserved." In re Marriage of Boyd. 200 N.W.2d 845. 853 (Iowa 1972).
13. The terms petitioner and respondent are used instead of plaintiff and defend-
ant and the proceeding is styled -In re the marriage of __ and _ -" rather
than as an adversary action: the term -dissolution- is used in place of -divorce"
and decrees are not to be "'awarded" to a party but only to "'affect" the relationship.
WAss. Rv. Con)i- § 26.09.010(Supp. 1973).
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may be limited to termination of the contract-the "status" itself-
rather than to questions of ancillary relief.
A. Jurisdiction: The Problem of Domicile
So far, no one has suggested that the public should be without a
voice in marital determinations. The question is not whether the
public has an interest in marriage contracts but whether "the state is a
third party whose interests take precedence over the private interests
of the spouses."' 4 However the public interest is characterized, it is
conceded that some formal proceeding is required for a change of rela-
tionship. As long as the proceedings are judicial, the problem of juris-
diction must necessarily be resolved.
Decrees of legal separation are in personam and may be thought of
as transitory actions. When more than a personal order is sought-
when status is to be changed-the action acquires an in rem quality
and different jurisdictional requisites are involved.' 5 For historical
reasons too lengthy to recite here, jurisdiction to terminate a marriage
usually has been founded upon a domiciliary relation between the
forum and the petitioning spouse or spouses.11 Jurisdiction to change
marital status cannot be conferred upon a court by agreement and
appearance of nondomiciliary spouses.' 7 Questions about jurisdic-
tional requisites do not arise frequently because most divorce acts
14. Posner v. Posner. 233 So. 2d 381. 383 (Fla. 1970).
15. In discussing the difference between the "equitable" suits to enforce marital
obligation and the "statutory" proceedings for divorce, the Washington court said:
The power. or jurisdiction, of the court thus proceeds upon differing, though
correlated, bases, one resting upon the marital status and situs. and the other
resting upon the personal and marital obligations flowing from and incident to
a marital relationship. The first requires jurisdiction over the marital status, and
the second jurisdiction over the parties.
Tupper v. Tupper. 63 Wn. 2d 585. 588. 388 P.2d 225. 227 (1964). The view that
marriage is a status and is to be treated as a res is clearly the traditional view. The
extent to which this concept is changed by the Dissolution Act so that the relationship
is to be regarded as contractual is a central inquiry.
16. Domicile has been defined as a settled legal relation between a person and a
place. A domicile may be acquired by establishing a dwelling place with the concur-
rent intention of making that place home. See Sasse v. Sasse. 41 Wn. 2d 363. 249 P.2d
380(1952).
17. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). While few people would contend
that marital actions are simple, transitory proceedings to be heard by any court of
general jurisdiction when both spouses appear. it is certainly no longer clear-if it
ever was-that such actions are truly in rem with exclusive jurisdiction in the state.
or states, of domicil.
379
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clearly specify that domicile shall be required.' 8 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has said that domicile is a constitutional
requirement for divorce jurisdiction ' but, despite a long line of deci-
sions by the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with full faith and credit,20
the precise issue of whether a sovereign state may elect a jurisdictional
base other than domicile is still open. It may well be, as Mr. Justice
Clark said in a dissenting opinion, that the "constitutional bugaboo is
a judge-made one .... -2 t
The jurisdictional issue is interesting because Section 3 of the Dis-
solution Act provides that the court has jurisdiction not only for resi-
dents but also when the petitioner "is a member of the armed forces
and is stationed in this state." The question of when a serviceman
acquires domicile in a state has been a bothersome one.2 2 A number
of states have statutes generally comparable to the new Washington
provision regarding military personnel and those provisions have been
held valid by state courts.2 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
spoken.
18. "'Clearly specify" may be an overstatement. In some states the legislative
language used is -'residence'" rather than "'domicile." This was true in Washington's
prior law. WxsHi. Ri v. Couit § 26.08.030 (1963). and is true in the present statute.
WASI. REv. CoD1 § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1973). Courts have construed "-residence- to
mean domicile. See Thomas v. Thomas. 58 Wn. 2d 377. 363 P.2d 107(1961).
19. Alton v. Alton. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). racated a.% moot, 347 U.S. 610
(1954).
20. These cases began at the turn of the century (.see Andrews v. Andrews. 188
U.S. 14 (1903)). and ranged from one extreme in Haddock v. Haddock. 201 U.S.
562 (1906). to another in the two decisions of Williams v. North Carolina. 317 U.S
287 ( 1942): 325 U.S. 226(1945).
21. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith. 349 U.S. I. 27 (1955).
22. See Note. Divorce-Domicile of Choice-Military Personel. 28 WasH. L.
Rrv. 161 (1953).
23. Craig v. Craig. 143 Kan. 624. 56 P.2d 464 (1936): Schaeffer v. Schaeffer.
175 Kan. 629. 266 P.2d 282 (1954): Wallace v. Wallace. 63 N.M. 414. 320 P.2d
1020(1958): Lauterbach v. Lauterbach. 392 P.2d 24 (Alas. 1964).
WASh. Ri v. Comt. § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1973) provides for jurisdiction, but it does
not control the conflict of laws questions which may be involved. Because marriage
has been regarded as a status or a res and because the res is said to be situated where
the persons are domiciled, courts have generally used the law of the forum to deter-
mine whether relief should be granted even though the wrongful acts or the conduct
which allegedly breached the marriage contract. may have occurred in another state
where such conduct would not be considered *'grounds" for divorce. See generally
Comment. Jturi.sdiction Vermis "Choice-ofLas" in Divorce Action.s, 25 ROCK), M r. L.
REV. 51 (1952).
If dissolutions are to be granted to persons not domiciled in the state such as service-
men. the conflict of laws question needs reconsideration. As .ludge Hastie. dissenting
in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667. 685 (1953). stated:
101 nce the power to decide the case is based merely upon personal jurisdiction
a court must decide as a separate question upon what basis, if any. the local
380
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The Acts of New Mexico and Alaska differ from the Washington
jurisdictional provision in one possibly significant manner. They pro-
vide that the serviceman must have spent a specified period of time in
the state prior to petitioning for dissolution of his marriage. The Dis-
solution Act does not require a prefiling residence period for either a
serviceman or for a person who claims domicile. Domicile can be
acquired immediately upon arrival in a state. Is there anything to sug-
gest that domicile or residence as a serviceman must exist for some
time prior to filing a marital status action?
The requirement of prefiling residence period has been before sev-
eral courts in recent years. The question asked, however, has been the
precise opposite of that suggested above: i.e., the issue has been
whether a residence period can be required rather than if such a period
is required to establish domicile. In Wymelenberg v. Syman,2 4 a
three-judge federal court held unconstitutional a Wisconsin require-
ment that a divorce petitioner reside in the state at least two years
before filing. The decision was based upon the equal protection and
due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution. A similar decision was reached in the Federal District Court
for the District of Hawaii, again by a three-judge court:"5 However, a
federal district court has upheld the Florida requirement of six months
prefiling residence.2 6
The division in lower federal courts may be resolved ultimately by
the Supreme Court. For Washington's purposes this does not seem
important. None of the decisions say there must be a prefiling residence
period. It is enough that Washington has, in its new law, stayed within
acceptable jurisdictional principles and has acknowledged that the
public has an interest when family status is to be changed. The public
policy demand for a cooling-off period is adequately met by the ninety
day delay after the proceeding is commenced. 7 The requirement for
substantive law of divorce can properly be applied to determine whether the plain-
tiff is entitled to the relief sought.
24. 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D.Wis. 1971).
25. Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).
26. Shiffman v. Askew. 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
27. WASI. REv. CODE § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1973) says the court shall proceed
"when ninety days have elapsed since the petition was filed and from the date when
service of summons was made upon the respondent or the first publication of sum-
mons was made. .. The requirement of filing and service -or publication to start
the ninety day period is carried over from WASh. REv. CoDE § 26.08.040 11961). The
prior AcL adversarial in nature, naturally required some form ofservice in all instances.
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domicile and for physical presence of a serviceman should suffice for
purposes of full faith and credit. Other questions, such as whether
Washington will become a "divorce mill," seem superficial and in any
event need not be decided for jurisdictional purposes.
B. Marriage Counseling
Lawyers probably have always recognized an ethical obligation to
help alienated spouses consider reconciliation. Despite such effort as
the legal profession may have made, one writer says that "the attor-
ney's role is synonymous with an impending divorce" and that "the
fulfillment of . . . present ethical duty falls far short of reflecting
reality and the needs of the client."28 The law has favored, and doubt-
lessly still does favor, the preservation of marriage, but at what price?
And how, if at all, is such a policy to be implemented?
Washington has had a Family Court for nearly a quarter century
and its duties, from the beginning, have been "to effect the reconcilia-
tion of the spouses or an amicable adjustment or settlement of the is-
sues of the controversy."2 1  Quite correctly, Family Court commis-
sioners have understood their duty to include divorce counseling as
well as reconciliation.30 The Bar Association Family Law Committee,
which controlled the drafting of the Dissolution Act, showed a sus-
tained interest in better counseling services, especially in experiments
which were under way in the Family Courts of Snohomish and King
Counties. :" This interest was reported to a "Family Law Conference"
of approximately 140 persons, nearly all nonlawyers, where it was
given an unenthusiastic reception. The Conference favored a cautious,
essentially voluntary service not too closely related to the judiciary.3 2
Under the new Act a question arises: If both parties join in the petition. will the
ninety days begin upon filing or must one serve for purely technical reasons? To
require service in such an instance seems wholly unnecessary.
28. Miarder. The Need for an Expanded Role. for the Attorne in Divorce Cotn-
.%eling, 4 FANtitLN L.Q. 280. 287 88 (1970).
29. WASH. REV. CODE §26.12.1701963).
30. See, e.g., statements in the R~sum6 of 1972 Annual Report. Special Calendars
Department for King County.
31. Report of the Family Law Committee 7-8 (July 1970): Minutes of the Family
Law Committee I (June II - 12. 1971).
Various studies of the Family Courts in King and Snohomish Counties were con-
ducted during the years 1969-72 by Manzer J. Griswold. Ph.D., Associate Professor
in the School of Social Work. University of Washington. Data from these studies
were considered during the drafting of the act.
32. Report of the Family Law Conference. Oct. 2 1-23. 197 1. This conference was
382
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The ultimate result of the Conference recommendation was enact-
ment of Section 3 (3)(b) of the Dissolution Act. That section permits
the judge to refer the parties to the Family Court, to "another coun-
seling service of their choice," or to order a continuance. Referral to a
counseling service or an order of continuance may suspend the disso-
lution proceeding for not more than 60 days. The Family Court Act
specifies that marital actions may be suspended for an initial 30 days
and then, for cause, an additional 90 days and, with the consent of the
parties, for even longer.3 3 Since the Family Court Act was not ex-
pressly amended, one may assume these time periods govern.
Authorization to refer to "another counseling service" was not in
the original HB 392. The addition of this language reflects a convic-
tion that private counselors may be able to help if the parties are re-
ferred by the court and if fees are made available. 34 The parties may
choose the counseling service. May they decline private counseling
entirely?3 5
Professional opinion is divided on the issue of whether parties
should be ordered to seek counseling.3"i The Washington legislature
has wrestled with this question once before. As originally enacted, the
Family Court Act permitted a judge to "recommend or invoke the aid
of physicians, psychiatrists or other specialists or the pastor or director
of any religious organization to which the parties may belong" if the
consent of both parties had been given. 37 In 1971 the statute was
organized and financed by the State Bar Association. Recommendations from the
conference were accepted as policy guides by the committee which drafted the bill
which ultimately became the Dissolution Act of 1973. Most of the persons attending
the conference were professionals who offer services related in some way to families.
They heard an explanation of the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act draft-
ed by the National Conference of-Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, pre-
sented by Mr. Bernard Helling, chairman of the Commissioner's drafting committee
and studied reports on the marriage and dissolution act proposed for Washington by
the State Bar Association's Family Law Committee. Among the reports considered
was one by the Honorable Alfred 0. Holte, who designed the family court experi-
ment for Snohomish County.
33. WASH. REV. CoDE § 26.12.190 (1963).
34. Id., § 26.09.140 was also amended to authorize the court to order payment of
"other professional fees" in addition to the traditional attorney's fees and suit costs.
35. It should be remembered that no referral is authorized if both spouses have
requested dissolution. See text accompanying section 1. C. I infra. Perhaps the section
here being discussed meahis that if the partners ask to be referred to a "counseling ser-
vice of their choice" the court may permit such referral as an alternative to an ap-
pearance in the Family Court.
36. For an interesting argument questioning the justification for counseling see
Rheinstein. The Liw, of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND.
L. REv. 633 (1956).
37. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.12.1"]0 (1963).
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amended to authorize the court to order such aid. The requirement
of consent no longer appears.
Doubt regarding the efficacy of coerced counseling was not the real
reason why the Dissolution Act, as originally drafted, did not au-
thorize the judge to order the parties to consult persons outside the
judicial structure. The reason was more basic. To order parties to
counsel with religious leaders has been held unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the separation of church and state,38 and an early Wash-
ington case held that ordering parties to consult with a medical practi-
tioner was beyond the proper judicial role. m" These questions are re-
opened by the amendment of the Family Court Act described above
and by the language added by amendment to Section 3 (3)(b) of the
Dissolution Act.-'
Iowa has experimented with a mandatory counseling requirement.4 '
The experience in that state indicates that at least two practical dif-
ficulties must be expected. The first of these is how to deal with a re-
fusal of a party to complete the counseling session or to comply with
an order to pay costs. Specific performance has long been thought
counterproductive in most personal relation cases42 and a refusal to
dissolve an unworkable marriage seems poor public policy.
38. People e.x r1e/. Bernat v. Bicek. 405 I1. 510. 91 N.E.2d 588 11950).
39. State ex rel. Waughop v. Superior Court. 72 Wash. 535. 130 P. 1139 (1913).
40. The dissolution act in Florida provides that when minor children are involved
or when one party denies breakdown, the court may " [o] rder either or both parties to
consult with a marriage counselor. psychologist. psychiatrist, minister, priest. rabbi, or
any other person deemed qualified by the court and acceptable to the party or parties
ordered to seek consultation .... . Fl A. STA1. § 61.052(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
This section was mentioned with approval in Riley v. Riley. 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla.
1972). The validity of the section was not in issue.
4 1. IOWA CoDt § 598.16 (CuM. Supp. 1973) provides, in part:
The court shall require such parties to Undergo conciliation for a period of at
least ninety days from the issuance of an order setting forth the conciliation pro-
cedure and the conciliator. Such conciliation procedures may include, but shall
not be limited to. referrals to the domestic relations division of the court, if es-
tablished. public or private marriage counselors, family service agencies. commu-
nity mental health centers. physicians and clergymen. Conciliation may be waived
bythecou rt upon ashowingofgood cause: provided, however, that itshall not be waived
if either party or the attorney appointed pursuant to section 598.12 objects.
The costs of any such conciliation procedtures shall be paid by the parties: how-
ever, if the court determines that such parties will be unable to pay the costs
without prejudicing their financial ability to provide themselves and any minor
children with economic necessities, such costs may be paid from the court expense
ftind.
For an analysis of the Iowa law see Peters. Iowa Rc frwm of Alhrriage Termination.
20 DRAKF L. Rrv. 211 (1971).
42. Snedaker v. King. III Ohio St. 225. 145 N.E. 15 (1924) is the most fre-
384
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The second problem is what to do with the counselor's report when
one is furnished. The Iowa solution seems to be that the report is to be
received as opinion evidence, available to corrobotate the party's testi-
mony of marital breakdown. 43 The counselor is subject to normal
cross-examination. The implications are significant. Will parties talk
freely when what is said may be used in litigation? This is a special
problem under Iowa's statute, which leaves the ultimate determination
of "the likelihood that the marriage can be preserved" to the judge
rather than to the spouses. That difficulty should not arise in Wash-
ington, but discussions related to ancillary relief might prove equalfy
embarrassing.
If mandatory counseling is either legally or practically uinworkable,
what viable alternative can be devised? The solution advanced by the
Dissolution Act is to give riew responsibility to the lawyer. He mus-
use his professional skill ft help the client decide whether a dissolution
is the best available' course: The Dissolution Act gives the client and
the attorney much greater capacity to manage the ancillary aspects of
a dissolution.4 4 Such control substantially enhanes, the counseling
potential of the lawyer and it does so' in a context familiar to him; i.e.,
evaluating the opportunity for and probable consequences of negotia-
tion. Marital counseling is inevitable; marriage reconcifiation n-iay 6e
a desirable spin-off as the parties are helped to a realistic appraisal of
their situatfon.
Nothing in the Dissolution Act resolves' one related, persistent
worry of the lawyer. Cart he, When requested, represent both parties?
Antenuptial agreements, have been, found unenforceable whien one
party did not have' fndependent advice.4 5 But separation contracts.
have been sustained where One spouse,, even though urged to do, so,,
elected not. to retain separate counsel. 46 Perhaps, the" aftorney siduld
"counsel the situation" so long as possible reconciliation is ufider dis-
cussion but should indicate clearly who is not his client whfen the' dfs-
cussion shifts' to counseling for dissolution, J
quently cited'judi'cial' d'isctissiari: See' 'Io Coni-ment. hyfifjctiVe Coztirol of Famnlyh R',-
laionY', 1 8 Ky. LY. 207 (59"0).
43'. &I're Nfarrfige of Boyd. 2700 'N'V._ ' 84'5 (Iowa 19'72).
44. The authority is proVided &iY' Section f of' fie Dissofution Akcf. W .xSw.
R' V.-CODE § f26.09'90 (Supp. 1973)'! Sie text ae ripani'g1sectioni 1I A, infr-a.
45. H'a'rifil?n v.- Merlitio. 44 V.- fd 8 52. 22 __ .2d" f2d5' (195"4Y" riefIfaffde'r i..
Friedlander; 80'Wn.- -d 29S. 494: P.2df "i08' ( 1-97f2). -
46: - H'afv6seri: V.- Rlal~orsern. 3' rW. Ap- 82 ,- 4' PJ:d f61, (l§g0), - Pst6 ,
P'este. I; rff, Ajp: f9- 459' P'.2d 70'(. 1469),.-
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C. When Reconciliation Fails
Given even the most favorable circumstances, reconciliation is dif-
ficult to arrange.1 7 It is, therefore, usually necessary to provide an
additional remedy. The Dissolution Act continues three traditional
forms of relief: separate maintenance, declarations of invalidity, and
-under the new name of dissolution-divorce. As will soon be
shown, some changes are made in each of these actions. Hopefully the
declaration of invalidity and the decree of legal separation will not be
sought often. Dissolution of a bankrupt marriage is clearly the remedy
of choice.
1. Dissolution and the Role of the Judge
Under the new Dissolution Act the judge may play basically a sup-
porting role, especially if no dispute exists over economic matters or
child problems. However, Section 3 of the Dissolution Act calls upon
the judge to do something related specifically to the marital status in
three different settings.
First, if the parties jointly petition for dissolution, or if the respon-
dent does not deny the petitioner's allegation of irretrievable break-
down, the court shall enter the decree. The judge is not required to
decide anything with respect to "irretrievable breakdown."
Second, if there is a denial of irretrievable breakdown, the judge
has a more substantial role. He is to consider "all relevant factors, in-
cluding the circumstances that gave rise to the petition, and the pros-
pects for reconciliation." Based upon such evidence, the judge must
follow one of two courses: find irretrievable breakdown and decree
dissolution or, upon request by a party or on his own motion, con-
tinue the matter for a set time or refer the parties to counseling.
No-fault statutes in some states permit the judge to refer the parties to
counseling despite their mutual allegation of irretrievable breakdown.
This cannot happen in Washington; although the referral need not be
47. A study of 170 husband-wife pairs in the Family Court for King County dis-
closed that *reconciliation agreements" were executed in 35% of the cases in which
both spouses sought help. I 1% of the cases in which one spouse petitioned for Family
Court intervention, and 10% if the instances in which the referral was made by mo-
tion of the judge. NM. GRISWOt0 & S. M i), KING CouN rY FAMILY COURT CONCItLIATION
SI RVI( R I SE.\RCII-IN-PRA(" I I(E DEVE I OI'ML-N I PROGRAM PROGRESS REI'OR I'. 1968- 1972
(Aug. 1972).
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requested by either spouse, at least one spouse must deny that the
marriage is beyond salvation. The philosophical gulf separating these
two forms of legislation is immense.
The third situation in which the judge is to do something con-
cerning marital status arises when the dispute returns from counseling
or after the period of adjournment. Once again the judge must choose
either of two courses. He must find that the parties have agreed to
reconciliation (note that the finding relates to the agreement of the
parties, not to the "fact" of reconciliation) and dismiss the matter, or
find that no reconciliation has occurred (of which the allegation of a
party is proof) and enter the decree of dissolution.
Apparently no other state has departed so sharply from tradition.
As already shown, Delaware continues to talk of fault and Iowa re-
quires corroborating evidence that the marriage cannot be preserved.
The developments in Florida48 and California 4." have been more so-
phisticated but the result, or at least the rhetoric, is still the same.
Although the Dissolution Act requires no independent evidence
aside from the allegation of the petitioner, it does not follow that there
is no judicial role for the judge concerning the dissolution of marital
status. (Of course there are all the ancillary issues surrounding
children and property. Here we are discussing only dissolution of the
status.) Defenses merit our attention.
2. Defenses to Dissolution
Everyone casually acquainted with traditional divorce litigation
recalls the unholy quadriga of collusion, condonation, connivance and
48. In Ryan v. Ryan. 277 So. 2d 266. 272 (Fla. 1973). the court stated:
IT] here must be appropriate evidence (albeit uncorroborated as the statute allows)
that in truth and in fact the marriage is irretrievably broken . . . we stated the
law still to be . . . '[that it] would be aiming a deadly blow at public morals
to decree a dissolution of the marriage contract merely because the parties re-
quested it. ....
49. The California court said that the legislature of that state:
rejected a proposal under which the court could have been required to dissolve
a marriage on a showing that the parties had taken certain procedural steps
and that a certain period of time had passed . . . . The court cannot perform
this contemplated function [of trying to reconcile the spouses] without evidence
as to the condition of the marriage. Therefore. section 4511 provides that "No de-
cree of dissolution can be granted upon the default of one of the parties . . but
the court must ... require proof of the grounds alleged ....
McKim v. McKim, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140, 144, 493 P.2d 868, 872 (1972).
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recrimination. Essentially all of these defenses reflected the same
theme: divorce is an adversary proceeding, and there must be an inno-
cent and guilty party. The resultant harm inflicted upon people and
upon the legal system was substantial, and elimination of such injury
provided a major reason for reform of the law. However, error on one
extreme obviously does not merit equal error on the other, and to de-
cree dissolution without any public control would be to err seriously.
Where, then, is the balance?
The beginning point is obvious; there must be evidence of irretriev-
able breakdown. Section 3(2) of the Dissolution Act enables the re-
sponding party to allege that the petitioner was "induced to file the
petition by fraud or coercion .... ." This section supplements the rule
of general practice "that a guardian [of a mental incompetent] has no
standing to bring an action for the divorce of his ward without specific
statutory authorization. ' ' 0 Inasmuch as proof of fraud, coercion or
incompetence of the petitioner constitutes a defense, the judge is
empowered to take evidence and, if one of these circumstances is
found, is required to dismiss the petition.
One additional observation should be made before leaving the sub-
ject of mental incompetence. Under the prior Washington law, the
plaintiff's lack of competence to enter a contract could be grounds for
divorce as could certain described chronic incompetence of the de-
fendant existing after the marriage. 5' Contractual incompetence can
still be used under the Dissolution Act to show the invalidity of a mar-
riage,52 but postcontractual incompetence of the respondent spouse is
only one factor which may be weighed by a petitioner in deciding
whether the marriage is irretrievably broken. It is interesting to notice
that the California no-fault dissolution act makes insanity of the re-
spondent an alternative ground for divorce and therefore is unlike the
new Dissolution Act.5 3 Presumably the California provision reflects a
concession to legislative necessity, a different public policy or mis-
guided sentiment.
The legal concepts of incompetence, fraud and coercion are rela-
50. For explanation of how the guardianship issue arose, see note 68 infl'a.
5 1. WASI. REv. CODE § 26.08.020 (1). (10) (1963).
52. WASHt. RI V. CODE § 26.09.040(4)(b)(i) (Supp. 1973).
53. CAL. CIV. COOE § 4506(2) (West 1970). The author does not know if the
insanity ground is ever used in California. He has been told by California lawyers
that, because of the evidentiary problems. the ground is simply ignored.
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tively well understood and dismissal of a petition for these reasons will
not jeopardize the nonadversarial quality of the Dissolution Act.
Another possible argument, however, may not be so readily managed.
The Dissolution Act has eliminated fault as a factor, but this does
not mean that a basis for dissolution need not be established. It must
be shown that the marriage is irretrievably broken. The question is,
what evidence will establish that fact? The Dissolution Act requires
only the allegation of a spouse. It does not require corroboration of
such testimony, but presumably it does require that the assertion be
honestly made.
The Florida court has examined this issue and has stated that proof
of "misrepresentations, concealments or untruth" in the petitioner's
allegation is a defense not because of the need to show fault but
simply because there is "a failure of proof that the marriage was irre-
trievably broken" and thus not "sufficient evidence upon which to
grant the relief sought. 54 The disturbing feature suggested by the
Florida decision is that a court may fail to differentiate between the
absence of evidence concerning breakdown of marriage and the "suf-
ficiency" of such evidence. Under the Washington Dissolution Act the
former would be a proper defense while the latter would not.
An analogy (perhaps more complex than helpful) can again be
made to the law of contracts. In determining whether a contract exists
the court must find consideration or its substitute. Having found con-
sideration, the court does not weigh its value or "adequacy," but
leaves the "value" determination to the contracting parties. 55 So it is
with the Dissolution Act requirement: The party determines the se-
verity or "adequacy" of the breakdown while the judge finds whether
the allegation is genuine or contrived.
3. Separate Maintenance and Declarations Concerning Validity
Disputing parties to a contract often arrange mutually satisfactory
54. Ryan v. Ryan. 277 So. 2d 266, 273 (Fla. 1973).
55. "[W]e speak of 'value' as if it were definite and exact . . . . In fact, it is
always variable, always a matter on which opinions may differ . . . . If there are
willing buyers and sellers . . . it is their willingness that determines value." A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 127, at 185 (1 vol. ed. 1952). But Corbin then cautions the reader:
"Inadequacy of consideration may be so gross as to be evidence of fraud .... ." Id.
This familiar doctrine should illustrate what the task of the judge now is when hear-
ing a dissolution petition where the defense of fraud is asserted.
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substitute performances. Failing this they may ask for specific per-
formance as an alternative remedy to termination. Decrees of separate
maintenance are of this nature. The decree derives from equity, not
from canonical rules or legislation, and it was granted in Washington
long before being authorized by statute." There are negative aspects
to the use of separate maintenance and the Washington court grad-
ually has developed precedents which limit both the availability and
duration of such decrees.5 7 The Dissolution Act authorizes the
court to decree legal separation if requested by a petitioner who
would be entitled to dissolution, provided such request is not objected
to by the respondent.5 8 However, the Dissolution Act also honors
Washington's prior experience by providing in Section 15, that any
time after six months, on motion of either party, "the court shall con-
vert the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution of mar-
riage."-:!
Prior Washington law allowed an annulment for a voidable mar-
riage and a decree of nullity for a void marriage. In deciding these
cases, the court has drawn a wavering line between voidable and void
marriages. Voidable marriages are those which, although defective in
some manner, exist until avoided.50 Void marriages, are those which,
having never legally existed, need not be set aside, though "in the in-
terests of society [it is] proper that the invalidity of such marriages be
56. In an action prior to the enactment of WASH. RLov. CODE § 26.08.120 (1963).
Washington's first legislative provision for separate maintenance, the court quoted
with approval a statement that "the decree compels a 'specific performance' of the
husbands' legal duty .... Cohn v. Cohn. 4 Wn. 2d 322. 325. 103 P.2d 366. 367
(1940).
57. For a brief history of the development, see Rieke. Divorce Act of 1949, 35
WASH. L. Ri v. 16. 49-50 (1960).
58. WAStI. Riv. CooL § 26.09.030(4) (Supp. 1973). It should be noted that legal
separation cannot be decreed until the end of the 90 day cooling-off period required
by the Act. I mmediate needs may. of course, be met by temporary orders pursuant to
§ 26.09.060. There is no more reason for a hasty entry of a coerced decree of legal separ-
ation than there is for a decree of dissolution. If the parties wish to resolve their
economic affairs more rapidly. they may do so entirely by their contract under
§ 26.09.070(2) without the time and trouble of a court action.
59. Id., § 26.09.150. Note that the court has no discretion concerning entry of the
dissolution. If the parties to the original decree of legal separation have never been
domiciled in Washington and are not in the military service. should the court refuse
to decree dissolution because of lack of jurisdiction'? Or does procurement of a legal
separation plus six months constitute adequate contact between the parties and the
state to justify jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage?
60. -'IT] he marriage is not void but merely voidable, and until legally annulled
is valid for all civil purposes." State v. McPherson. 72 Wash. 371. 375. 130 P. 481.
483 (1913).
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adjucated, and the marital status of the parties be made a matter of
record."6'
However, Washington has been unfriendly to both petitions for
annulment and decrees of nullity. Capacity to consent to the contract
has been found readily;62 the test for fraud has been stringent.13 An
early annulment provision has been read restrictively so as to allow
only a party to the defective marriage to initiate the suit, thus pre-
cluding annulment actions by parents or other relatives. 4
In 1949, as part of a new divorce act, the Washington legislature
made the contractual defects permitting annulment also a ground for
divorce" 5 It also enacted a new section to provide a decree of nullity
for a void marriage.36 This legislation was a valiant effort toward clar-
ity, but in a lost cause. One immediate consequence was to raise the
question whether a spouse.with a defective, but not void, marriage
might elect either annulment or divorce. The court denied such an
option. It felt the legislative policy favored divorce over annulment, a
decision which may have eliminated all annulments in Washington
although the court expressly declined a request to make a statement to
that effect."7
There were practical distinctions among these remedies. Only di-
vorce required a prefiling residence and a post-filing "cooling-off' pe-
riod. A petition for annulment, but not for divorce, could be brought
by a guardian." 8 The decree of nullity, but not annulment or divorce,
61. Huard v. McTeigh. 232 P. 658, 663 (Ore. 1925).
62. In re Gallagher's Estate, 35 Wn. 2d 512. 213 P.2d 621 (1950); In re Romano's
Estate, 40 Wn. 2d 796, 246 P.2d 501 (1952).
63. Harding v. Harding. II Wn. 2d 138. 118 P.2d 789 (1941).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.130 (1963), not repealed by the Dissolution Act,
provides for annulment "only at the suit of the party laboring under the disability, or
upon whom the force or fraud is imposed." Parents of a minor have no standing,
In re'Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 P. 159 (1909); nor do legatees of a will. In re
Romano's Estate, 40 Wn. 2d 796, 246 P.2d 501 (1952).
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.020(l) (1963). The divorce ground is stated in
essentially identical terms to those used in the annulment section, note 64 stupra.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.050 (1963).
67. Saville v. Saville, 44 Wn. 2d 793, 271 P.2d 432 (1954).
68. The latter point caused some difficulty in Jones v. Minc 77 Wn. 2d 381, 462
P.2d 927 (1969). A guardian sought relief for an incompetent ward, alleging that the
contract of marriage was avoidable because of incompetence and fraud. The court,
citing Saville, held that divorce was the necessary remedy and acknowledged that
normally an action for divorce cannot be initiated by a guardian. However, where the
basis for relief pre-Saville would have been annulment and thus could have been
sought by the guardian, it is now proper for the guardian to sue for divorce.
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could be obtained after the death of a party. These subleties were
becoming unreasonably difficult to manage.
Section 4 of the Dissolution Act addresses all these problems. It
eliminates the distinction between void and voidable marriages so
far as a remedy is involved and simply authorizes a declaration of
invalidity.t :) The jurisdictional requirement for a declaration of inval-
idity is the same as for dissolution. However, no cooling-off period is
required. The court declaring invalidity has the same power to award
ancillary relief as it does in dissolution and any child born or con-
ceived during a marriage of record is legitimate. The decree of inval-
idity is, in short, very much like the decree of dissolution.
Three major changes result from this simplification of prior Wash-
ington law. First, the action must be brought while both parties are
living. This change eliminates almost every reason for struggling to
distinguish a void from a voidable contract. Second, invalidity be-
cause of bigamy may be alleged not only by a party to the contract
but also by the legal spouse (i.e., the spouse in the original marriage)
or by a child of either party. The child, presumably, may be the issue
of either party and any other person.
The third change.is a bit more complex. As originally drafted Sec-
tion 4 (2)711 was intended to permit a spouse whose marriage is ques-
tioned by another entity, perhaps an insurer or an obligor of a fund
from which a spouse might claim benefit, to establish the validity of
the marriage. The statute permits this action to be brought "at any
time," thus after as well as before a death. The moving party, the peti-
tioner, was to be the spouse whose marriage was disputed and the en-
tity questioning the validity of the marriage was to be the respondent.
By an unfortunate misunderstanding, an amendment substituted the
word "petitioner" in place of "respondent" and the subsection, as en-
acted, has little or no utility. Legislative correction is clearly needed.
Except for the absence of a cooling-off period, there is little differ-
69. The grounds for a declaration of invalidity are lack of competence to consent
because of age. existing prior marriage. consanguinity, mental incompetence or intoxi-
cation and for lack of consent because of fraud or duress. See Wxst. Ri v. CoD[ §
26.09.040(4)(b)(i) (Supp. 1973).
70. WASt. REV. CODE § 26.09.040(2) (Supp. 1973) provides: "If the validity of
the marriage is denied or questioned at any time. either or both parties to the marriage
may petition the court for a judicial determination of the validity of such marriage.
The petitioner in such action shall be the person or entity denying or questioning the
validity of the marriage."
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ernce between dissolution and the declaration of invalidity. The latter
remedy exists only because some persons, for religious or other rea-
sons, may prefer a declaration that they were not married, rather than
a decree of dissolution, A9 authorized in the Dissolution Act, the dec-
laration of invalidity does meet the doctrinal niceties involved in pro-
viding ancillary relief and in preserving legitimacy of issue even when
the contract was "void." It also establishes. a means of handling the
conflict of Jaws questions which might arise when, under the law of
the state where the marriage was attempted, the marriage would be
characterized as void.
II, THE ECONOMIC DETERMINATIONS
The state is instinctively paternalistic. A firmly ingrained feature of
previous divorce law was that separating parties could not be trusted
to resolve their own problems. At least the judge, and until recently
the prosecuting attorney,7' had to scrutinize the circumstance of the
divorce to protect against unfairness.72
A petition for divorce also seemed, to the state, a good opportunity
to enforce support obligations. Thus when a judge suspected nonsup-
port he could "in his discretion, refuse to grant an order of divorce
until the suspected party is prosecuted and finally found guilty or in-
nocent. 73 Whether such thralldom is constitutional was never tested
in Washington, but it seems bad policy. The right to dissolution of an
unworkable marriage is one matter; the enforcement of an obligation
to support is another. The new Dissolution Act addresses these issues.
The provisions for property division and alimony or maintenance as it
71. Until 1972 the prosecuting attorney was, for all practical purposes. a party to
divorce actions. He was to be served with all pleadings and other papers. It was his
duty to appear in all default and uncontested cases. He had the right of appeal. He or
his proctor advised the court with respect to property and support provisions. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.080 (Supp. 1972). This section was amended in 1972 to
relieve the prosecutor of these duties except where the court expressly ordered an
appearance.
72. A fair description of this duty. although the statement is dicta, can be found
in State ex rel. Atkins v. Superior Court, I Wn. 2d 677. 685. 97 P.2d 139, 142 (1939):
In an action for divorce, a property settlement or agreement between the parties
may be entirely disregarded by the court, and should be followed ... only when
the court is satisfied that the agreement is fair and just and ... conforms to the
views of the court as to a proper division ....
See also Lee v. Lee, 27 Wn. 2d 389. 178 P.2d 296 (1947).
73. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.08.070 (1963).
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is now called, will be examined here. The provisions for child support
are delayed to a later point.
A. Should the Parties Decide for Themselves
Section 7 may be the keynote of the entire Dissolution Act. Stated
tersely, it gives the parties broad powers to arrange their own fiscal
affairs. They may not, however, exercise such presumptively binding
control with respect to matters of child custody, visitation or support.
Two quite different situations are covered by the section: (1) The
legal needs of parties who wish to protect themselves in an orderly
separation without termination of their marital status and (2) the legal
needs which arise when a change of marital status is involved. 74
1. Contract Separation Without a Decree of Court
Spouses often separate without resort to litigation, and Washington
case law has long permitted such parties to relieve each other from
future, inter sese, obligation. 75 They could also, as between them-
selves, change their property from community to separate.7 6 What was
unclear was the effect of their actions upon third parties. It would be
clearly inappropriate to upset, by such agreement, the rights of credi-
tors whose claims predated the agreement, 77 but would it be reason-
able to protect one spouse from debts subsequently incurred by the
other?
The analysis must begin with the fact that one spouse is obligated
for many obligations of the other by the family expense statute 78 and
by Washington's community property system.7 1 However, neither of
these statutory schemes will bind the noncontracting spouse if the
creditor knows, when the credit is extended to the contracting spouse,
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070 (Supp. 1973).
75. Parsons v. Tracy. 127 Wash. 218. 220 P. 813(1923).
76. In re Estate of Osicka. I Wn. App. 277, 461 P.2d 585 (1969).
77. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn. 70 Wn. 2d 893. 425 P.2d 623(1967). holds that such rights are not disturbed by separation contract or by termina-
tion of the marital status.
78. WASH. RLV. CODE § 26.16.205 (Supp. 1972).
79. WAsH. RIV. COD- ch. 26.16 (1963 & Supp. 1972). See generally Cross. The
Comntuinity Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640. 656 (1955). and Cross.
Eqtality for Spou.ses in Washington Commtunity Property Lai-1972 Stattftorv%
Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527 (1973).
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that no family relation then exists and that the antecedent conditions
for the community property agency in fact do not exist."O The concern
of a separated spouse is to be certain that prospective creditors will
have such knowledge.
The formal reason why termination of marital status ends the expo-
sure of a former spouse to future obligations of the other is because
without a marriage there is neither a "family" nor a "community." But
how does that formality help the creditor who, perhaps very reason-
ably, assumes that the former marriage still exists? Why is he not per-
mitted a recovery based upon apparent agency or some form of estop-
pel? Surely the answer is that the decree of dissolution is a matter
of public record and the creditor has a practical means of protecting
himself. Credit managers do just that. Section 7 builds upon this rea-
soning to enable separatiiig spouses to obtain, by contract, the same
protection against future obligation which they could obtain by disso-
lution of their marriage.
Section 7(2) requires separating spouses to record their contract of
separation and publish notice thereof in a "legal newspaper" if they
wish the advantage of "notice to all persons of such separation and of
the facts contained in the recorded document." The publication (and
presumably the recording) must be made in the county where the par-
ties resided prior to the separation. 81 If a contract is made after a sep-
aration has occurred, prudence might indicate recording and pub-
lishing in more than one location.
2. Separation Contract as Part of the Judicial Determination
The Dissolution Act made two major changes regarding separation
agreements used in conjunction with a status change. First, the prior
rule held that a separation agreement had no binding effect upon the
court. The agreement was to be adopted only if its terms were deemed
fair and equitable by the judge.82 The Dissolution Act reverses this.
The agreement, except for terms relating to children, "shall, be binding
upon the court unless it finds .. . that the separation contract was un-
fair at the time of its execution. '83
80. Yates v. Dohring. 24 Wn. 2d 877. 168 P.2d 404 (1946).
81. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.070(2) (Supp. 1973).
82. See note 72 supra.
83. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (Supp. 1973).
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This provision follows closely the suggestion of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act except that the Commissioners use the term
"unconscionable" in place of "unfair.1 84 Either version reflects the
view that amicable arrangements are to be preferred over adversary
determinations. Only when the parties have not elected to contract or
when their contract is found to have been unfair will the judge make
original provision for the disposition of property, maintenance and the
discharge of existing obligations.
The second change is technical but significant. Separation contracts
are frequently incorporated into the court's decree in order to gain
access to such enforcement advantages as contempt citations and
judgment liens, which are not available for a simple contract.8 5 Under
prior law, moreover, a contract which made provision for the eco-
nomic affairs of the litigants, if not incorporated, became a nullity
upon the entry of a decree of divorce.8" On the other hand, an agree-
ment which was incorporated lost its identity as a contract, by reason
of the doctrine of "merger, '8 7 and thereafter could be modified only
by modification of the decree itself.8 8 Is it possible to have both a con-
tract and a judgment at once?
The principal advantage in preserving the contract arises when en-
forcement is sought outside the United States, where the full faith and
credit provision of the Federal Constitution is inapplicable '1 The
Commissioners on Uniform Laws first thought that allowing the con-
84. UNII ORM MI ARRIAGE AN) DIVORCi Aci § 306(b). The comment to this section
indicates that the word "unconscionable" has acquired sufficient meaning in commercial
dealings to protect "against overreaching, concealment of assets. and sharp dealing
not consistent with the obligations of marital partners to deal fairly with each other."
The commissioners stress the fact that "'unconscionability" has acquired definition
because of its use in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODL § 2-302. It is worth noting
that the UNII ORt CoMMsERCIAl COMF section tests the conscionability of the term as
of the date of contracting. as does WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (Supp. 1973).
85. Ex rel. Ridenour. 174 Wash. 152. 24 P.2d 418 (1933) held that a citation for
contempt is not available to enforce contracts which are not incorporated. A good
discussion of the use of judgment liens in connection with support obligations can
be found in Swanson v. Graham. 27 Wn. 2d 590. 179 1.2d 288 11947).
86. Mathews v. Mathews. I Wn. App. 838. 466 P.2d 208 (1970).
87. In Nlickens v. klickens. 62 Wn. 2d 876. 881. 385 P.2d 14. 17 t1963). the
Washington court said: -'Where the property settlement agreement is approved by a
divorce decree, the rights of the parties rest upon the decree rather than the property
settlement." United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Price. 46 Wn. 2d 587. 283 P.2d 119 (1955)
is cited as authority.
88. Corson v. Corson. 46 Wn. 2d 61 . 283 P.2d 673 (1955).
89. For a discussion of the problem see A. IRI-NZWt1G6. (ON- R I oi Lxws § 82
n. I ( 1962).
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tract to exist concurrently with a judgment would, because of possible
modification of one but not of the other, cause "intolerable confusion
or injustice . . . ."110 As they then viewed it, an election between con-
tract or judgment was necessary. Subsequently this issue was resolved
in the proposed Uniform Act as it has been in the Washington Disso-
lution Act: Unless the contract provides otherwise, its terms are to be
set forth in the decree and become an order. However, Subsection (6)
of Section 7 prevents a "merger" and subsection (7) settles part of the
concern about disparate modification of the contract vis-A-vis the
judgment by providing that the contract terms are "automatically
modified by modification of the decree.""' The reverse problem (mod-
ification of the decree by amendment of the contract) is not mentioned,
but Washington law has been emphatic in saying that court decrees
may not be altered by contract '2 and presumably the legislature had
no intention of changing that rule.
Subsection (8) of Section 7 may, however, cause a problem. : 3 That
subsection permits the parties "by mutual agreement . . . to terminate
the separation contract ... without formality unless the contract was
recorded ... ." This provision, which was added to the original bill by
an amendment, must have been intended to permit the parties to
terminate an unrecorded separation agreement by mutual rescission
only when their marriage still existed and when the contract had not
been incorporated into a decree. However, this intention is nowhere
stated, and because of its placement immediately after subsection (7),
which deals with modification of the contract by modification of the
decree, one might contend that the intent was to permit termination of
the decree by recission of the contract. It seems probable that the leg-
islature intended only to enable parties to remove their contract from
90. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(e). Comment.
91. WASH. REV. ConE § 26.09.070(6). (7) (Supp. 1973).
92. The clearest cases are those dealing with child support. Griggs v. Morgan, 4
Wn. App. 468. 481 P.2d 913 (1971) is one example. The court suggests that a differ-
ent result might be reached in a contest between the former spouses which does not
involve child support. Assuming that spoitses can. under the Dissolution Act of 1973.
modify future nlaintenance by contract, it would be desirable to conform the decree
by modification proceedings.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(8) (Supp. 1973) provides: "If at any time the
parties to the separation contract by mutual agreement elect to terminate the separation
contract they may do so without formality unless the contract was recorded as in




the public record and did not intend to suggest that a decree of court
could be affected. However, the argument that a decree can be modi-
fied by "mutual agreement ... without formality" may look attractive
to an obligor-spouse who, for a fair price, bought what he assumed
was a discharge from all future duty.
3. Some Tax Considerations
It will be noticed that the contracting spouses by agreement "may
expressly preclude or limit modification of any provision for mainte-
nance set forth in the decree. ' ' : 4 This is contrary to prior law under
which future alimony was subject to modification.' 5 This new provi-
sion is consistent with the Dissolution Act's general objective of per-
mitting spouses to settle their own affairs. One consequence is that the
spouses now can exert more control over the tax aspects of their ac-
tions. This is not the place to treat the tax issues extensively, but the
following illustrations may suggest some initial considerations.
The Lester case :'"" marked the significant tax distinctions between
alimony and property division: alimony is treated as income to the
payee and is deductible by the payor, while in the case of a division of
property there is no income to the payee and no deduction available
to the payor. The advantage of having the major income producer pay
alimony and thus be entitled to an income tax deduction has of course
been recognized. However, because of Washington's frequently stated
opposition to long-term alimony"7 and the inability of the parties to
control termination of the order, it has been considered unwise to plan
upon the advantage. Now that the parties may formulate their own
separation agreement which must be adopted by the court unless
found unfair and because the parties may preclude modification of
alimony by the contract terms, alimony may now be relied upon as a
viable tax planning tool. If it is desired to take the opposite approach
94. WxsI. RIv. (ODE § 26.09.070(7) (Supp. 1973).
95. Wsu RF.v. Comt § 26.08.110 (1961).
96. Commissioner v. Lester. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
97. The duration of alimony has been litigated frequently in Washington and the
decisions are not entirely in harmony. However, the following language from Berg v.
Berg. 72 Wn. 2d 532. 534, 434 P.2d I. 2 (1967) is probably a fair summary: "It is
not the purpose of the law to place a permanent responsibility upon a divorced spouse
to support a former wife indefinitely. She is likewise under an obligation to prepare
herself so that she might become self-supporting. The allowance of alimony is to pro-
vide such an interval for her reasonable preparation.,"
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and to make a property division with periodic payments of a "fixed"
amount, using the so-called "ten-year rule"' 8 which does not impose
the tax obligation upon the payee nor give the deduction to the payor,
care must be taken to provide that payment is to be completed despite
the death of either spouse or the remarriage of the payee. Under Sec-
tion 17 of the Dissolution Act,?: either of these events would termi-
nate a duty to pay maintenance unless contrary provision is made.
Likewise, if the total amount to be paid is regarded as uncertain, the
tax plan may be upset.
One other tax aspect deserves mention. A wife may now deduct from
her income the child's expenses if the child is dependent upon her.100
Given this opportunity, the spouses may wish to describe all of the
husband's periodic payments to the wife as maintenance rather than
child support. This approach would allow the payor to deduct the
payments as maintenance while enabling the wife to claim the child
dependency deduction.
B. Ancilliary Relief in the Absence of a Separation Agreement
When the parties have not resolved their own affairs or when their
efforts to do so have been found unfair, a court must divide the prop-
erty, decide whether a request for maintenance will be granted and
respond to requests for temporary orders.10' What changes does the
Dissolution Act of 1973 make with respect to these determinations?
1. Temporary Orders
Section 6 of the Dissolution Act deals with temporary maintenance
98. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. § 71(c)(2).
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973).
100. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(l).
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.050 (Supp. 1973) imposes the duty upon the court
to "'consider. approve, or make" such provision "[i] n entering a decree of dissolution
of marriage, legal separation. or declaration of invalidity .... - The status determination
and ancillary relief, except in the exceptional situations discussed below, are to be
ordered at the same time.
The words "consider, approve, or make" reflect the fact that maintenance may not
always be appropriate but may be "considered": that a separation contract may be
"approved"; and that disposition of property and obligations shall, when jurisdiction to
do so exists, be "made".
Specific guidance for the division of property is found in § 26.09.080; maintenance
is dealt with in § 26.09.090; and the authority for temporary orders is in § 26.09.060.
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for a spouse and temporary support for a child. '12 It does not govern
temporary custody, that issue being provided for elsewhere.103 The
motion for temporary support may be made either under Section 6
(1)(a) as part of an action for dissolution, separation or declaration of
invalidity,' 0 4 or it may be made under Section 6 (1)(b) at a subsequent
proceeding when the court has acquired jurisdiction over assets or
over a spouse not previously before the court.'0 -
The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit of the party
seeking support or maintenance. As a part of the motion for tempo-
rary maintenance or support or by a separate motion and affidavit,
the petitioner may also request a temporary restraining order or a pre-
liminary injunction. The relief requested may run against any person
when the object is to conserve assets or to avoid removal of a child
from the jurisdiction but only against a party to the action when the
object is to prevent molestation or the entry into a dwelling of the
family or of the moving spouse.'" Bringing third parties before the
court to avoid loss or removal of property has been common practice
and any extension of jurisdiction in the Dissolution Act is slight."07
Although the distinction is not always observed, the rules for civil
practice in Washington clearly distinguish a preliminary injunction
from a temporary restraining order.1 08 The preliminary injunction
cannot be issued without notice to the adverse party, while, under the
limited circumstances prescribed in the rule, a temporary restraining
order may be so issued. Furthermore, in most situations a temporary
restraining order automatically terminates in a few days, and if a
longer period of injunction is desired it is necessary to give notice and
to obtain a preliminary injunction. Inasmuch as civil practice governs
proceedings under the Dissolution Act, as provided in Section I(1),":
the notice rules apply. Section 6(3) of the Dissolution Act does, how-
102. hi., § 26.09.060.
103. Id., § 26.09.200.
104. Id., § 26.09.060( H(a).
105. Id., § 26.09.060( I)(b).
106. Id., § 26.09.06012) provides for an order "restraining or enjoining any per-
son" and § 26.09.060(2)(a). relating to assets, and § 26.09.060(2)(d). relating to
child removal. are not limited in scope. However. the subsections referring to moles-
tation. § 26.09.060(2)(b). and to entering a home. § 26.09.060(2)(c). extend pro-
tection only to the "other party." i.e., to the spouse who is not restrained or enjoined.
107. See WASI. SiPEIR. Cf. (Civ.) R. 64. 65. See al.'o Kelley v. Bausman 98 Wash.
686. 168 P. 181 ( 1917): Harding v. Harding. I I Wn. 2d 138. 118 P.2d 789 t1941).
108. WASh. St' i R. Cl. (Civ.) R. 65(a). (b).
109. WASH. Ri~v. Co), § 26.09.010(1) (Supp. 1973).
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ever, reduce slightly the proof required before a temporary restraining
order may be issued without notice; "0 under the provision of the Dis-
solution Act, the moving party need show only that irreparably injury
could result in the absence of an order, whereas the civil rule requires
a showing that such harm will result.
Subsections (4) and (5) of Section 6 refer to temporary orders and
to a temporary injunction.' Washington practice does not have a
"temporary injunction" and the words, as used in Section 6, mean
temporary injunctive relief-whether in the form of a preliminary
injunction or of a temporary restraining order.
2. In What Court and at What Time May Economic Relief Be
Sought?
Authority to divide property "as shall appear just and equitable" (as
distinguished from a partition according to existing although undi-
vided interests) or to order a party to pay maintenance to another to
whom the obligor is no longer related, are not common law powers.
Such jurisdiction is founded upon statutory grant." 12 Divorce statutes
often have provided such authority to judges but it has not been clear
whether the power existed only at the time of the termination of the
marital relation or whether it could also be exercised later on behalf
of a former spouse. Because so many divorces have been ex parte, liti-
gation and legislation concerning the issue have flourished. Good au-
thority exists for both sides of the debate.' '3
In 1899, Washington decided that even though a valid divorce had
already been entered in another jurisdiction, a Washington court
could make a subsequent "equitable" division of property. 1 4 Years
later a former husband, having been divorced ex parte in California,
110. Id., § 26.09.060(3).
11I. Id., § 26.09.060(4). (5).
112. Loomis v. Loomis. 47 Wn. 2d 468. 288 P.2d 235 (1955).
113. See, e.g. Vanderbilt. 354 U.S. 416 (1957). Armstrong v. Armstrong. 350
U.S. 568 (1955) for case discussion: NJ. Ri:v. STAT. §§ 2A:34.23--.24 (Supp. 1973-
74). MAss. GEN. LAvs ANN. ch. 208. § 34(1969) and R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § (15)-
(5)-(6) (1970) for statutory provisions and Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953) for
general discussion.
114. Adams v. Abbott. 21 Wash. 29. 56 P. 931 (1899). The fact that the real property
was located in Washington was. no doubt. thought important to this decision. Fjow-
ever. the court might well have found the former spouses tenants in common of the
former community property and divided the asset equally.
401
Washington Law Review
asked the Washington court: "Is there any duty to support an ex-wife
when the original divorce decree contained no valid order for alimony?"
The court replied: "There may be, depending upon the facts in each
case."' 15 One can conclude that where a divorcing court had in per-
sonam jurisdiction over only the petitioning party and entered an ex
parte decree that the nonappearing spouse has a "personal right" to
support which was never before the court and thus could not have been
lost. ' 16
On the other hand, if both parties were before the court, must we
conclude that a failure to receive ancillary relief was a denial by the
court and, furthermore, is res judicata?"17 A good argument can be
made that the failure to award relief should not be res judicata. Main-
tenance is supposedly based upon the need of one spouse and the
financial ability of the other. A finding, of no need or of inability to
provide maintenance at one date ought not to be final and to preclude
a contrary determination at a later date if circumstances change. The
Washington court has flirted with the last expressed theory 18 as well
as with the res judicata theory."" Legislative help was needed and it is
given in the new law.
The Dissolution Act provides that a property division and an award
of maintenance may be made by a court which lacked jurisdiction
over an absent spouse in a prior dissolution proceeding.' 2 0 The same
sections of the Act also authorize the courts, subsequent to a dissolu-
tion, to award property with respect to which it earlier lacked jurisdic-
tion. The Dissolution Act does not specifically state that the principle
115. Davidson v. )avidson. 66 Wn.2d 780. 785. 405 P.2d 261. 265 (1965). the
court said:
Where the right, if any. to support, or to a division of the community property, if
any. could not be determined in the divorce action because of the absence of the
respondent from the state in which the decree of divorce was granted. those
questions may still be adjudicable in the state where the respondent resides.
116. This reasoning was used by Mr. Justice Douglas in the famous "divisible
divorce" opinion. Estin v. Estin. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
117. This position appears to have been adopted by New York in Lynn v. Lynn.
302 N.Y. 193. 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951). This theory explains why lawyers sometimes
struggle for a one dollar a year alimony award to avoid the resjudicata effect, count-
ing upon the court's power to later modify the nominal sum to a larger amount if
circumstances later should make this necessary.
118. Brown v. Brown. 8 Wn. App. 528. 507 P.2d 157 (1973). Hanson v. Hanson.
47 Wn. 2d 439. 287 P.2d 879 (1955).
119. Fleckenstein v. Fleckenstein. 59 Wn. 2d 131. 366 P.2d 688 (1961): Hudson
v. Hudson. 8 Wn. 2d 114. III P.2d 573 (1941).
120. WASI. Riv. Conir § 26.09.080 .090 (Supp. 1973).
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of res judicata governs in other situations but the negative implication
seems obvious.
3. What Criteria Are To Be Used?
The court's duty to fashion the ancillary features of a dissolution,
especially without contractual guidance from the parties, is a heavy
responsibility. While statutory criteria may help, in the last analysis,
"it is the economic condition in which the decree will leave the parties
that engenders the paramount concern in providing for child support
and alimony and in making a property division."' 21 The court has had
and continues to have broad discretion to consider the factors of in-
debtedness, available property and support orders in formulating a
reasonable solution. In Washington, "'the allowance of alimony de-
pends on two factors: (1) -The necessities of the wife; (2) the financial
ability of the husband' ... [and] we are of the opinion that one of the
criteria in making a property settlement between the parties is, like-
wise, the necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the hus-
band .... "122
Nothing in the Dissolution Act changes these basic criteria.' 23 The
Dissolution Act continues the long-standing Washington rule that all
community and separate property of the spouses is before the court
for disposition but does not attempt to settle the vexing problem of
what constitutes property.' 24 We must also anticipate a continuation
of the difficulty of distinguishing a division of property from an award
of alimony.
121. Rehak v. Rehak, I Wn. App. 963. 966, 465 P.2d 687, 689 (1970).
122. Luithle v. Luithle, 23 Wn. 2d 494. 502, 161 P.2d 152. 156(1945).
123 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080(4) expressly refers to - [t] he economic circum-
stances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective .... 
and § 26.09.090(f) refers to "' [t] he ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance."
124. Washington cases have reflected special doubt over how to classify retirement
benefits. The problem intensified in 1971 with the decision of DeRevere v. DeRevere.
5 Wn. App. 446, 488 P.2d 763 (1971), rev'd on rehearing, 5 Wn. App. 741, 491 P.2d
249 (1971). where the court of appeals first found that a "not yet fully vested" retire-
ment plan was not property available for division although it could be considered in
fixing an alimony award. On rehearing. the court replaced its earlier opinion and ex-
pressed the view that such an interest was property available for division.
The Washington Supreme Court has recently reduced much of the confusion by
holding that even a military pension, though not available to the husband for another
13 months, was property which could be divided. Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573.
403
Washington Law Review Vol. 49: 375, 1974
However, there are some changes. One change, foreshadowed by the
equal rights movement, is that a wife may now be required to provide
maintenance for her former husband. 2 5 Technically this is a new law
for Washington, 26 5 but in some instances husbands had already been
awarded such relief. '2 7 Second, "[t] he standard of living established
during the marriage" may now be considered in fixing maintenance. 2 8
This is precisely the opposite of the court's recent dictum that: "The
maintenance of a lifestyle to which one has become accustomed is not
a test [for awarding alimony]."t2t A third change from the prior
Washington law is that fault is no longer to be considered in fixing
maintenance or in dividing property. 130 States adopting "no-fault"
divorce legislation are sharply divided over the issue whether evidence
of fault is appropriate and useful in deciding property division and
alimony questions. It seems that where a no-fault ground has been
added to traditional fault grounds in an existing statute, the general
tendency has been to continue consideration of fault in connection
with other relief.' 3' Jurisdictions which have eliminated all fault
512 P.2d 736 (1973). One method of calculating the present value of such an interest
can be seen in Weiss v. Weiss, 75 Wn. 2d 596. 452 P.2d 748 (1969). These benefits.
and others such as social security, are all too easily overlooked in settling accounts
between the spouses. It can be expensive for the lawyer to make this mistake-as a
$100.000 malpractice recovery in California this year demonstrates. Smith v. Lewis.
31 Cal. App. 3d 677. 107 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1973).
125. W.si. REv. CoDL § 26.09.090(l) (Supp. 1973) provides: "Itlhe court may
grant a maintenance order for either spouse."
126. "It is elementary that in states and countries having the source of their
jurisprudence in the common law. a husband has no legal right to an award of alimony.
as against the wife, in the absence of a statutory enactment so providing." State ex
rel. Jacobson v. Superior Court. 120 Wash. 359. 360. 207 P. 227. 228 (1922). Nor
was the wife's separate property a "resource" to the husband so as to preclude him
from social security. Christiansen v. Department of Social Security. IS Wn. 2d 465.
131 P.2d 189(1942).
127. The court has taken advantage of the blurred line between property division
and alimony so as to require a wife to make periodic payments to a husband. Walls
v. Walls, 179 Wash. 440. 38 P.2d 205 (1934) and has held that the spouses could.
by their property settlement contract, enable the judge to include alimony for the
husband in the decree. &lcKendry v. McKendry. 2 Wn. App. 882. 472 P.2d 569 (1970).
One is reminded of the ancient adage that hard cases make bad law. The Dissolution
Act makes such excessive refinements unnecessary.
128. WAst REv. CoFi- § 26.09.090(c) Stpp. 1973).
129. Friedlander v. Friedlander. stupra note 7, at 297.
130. Fault was. in alimony, a "persuasive force and [couldl always be inquired
into ...... Memmer v. Memmer 27 Wn. 2d 414. 178 P.2d 720. 723 (1947). Con-
cerning property division. "fault Iwas] also a factor to be considered .... ." Wagner
v. Wagner. I Wn. App. 328. 331. 461 P.2d 577. 579 (1969). See also Colson
v. Colson. 2 Wn. App. 837. 470 P.2d 236 (1970).
131. Statutes which appear to have added a no-fault ground without excluding
fault as a factor in property disposition include: ARK. Srsr. AN. § 34-1202(7)
404
The Dissolution Act
grounds for dissolution are also divided, but the trend in these states
appears to favor elimination of fault for all purposes.'3 2
It has been estimated that, prior to the adoption of a new dissolu-
tion act in California, fault was introduced to obtain a larger share of
property in "over 96 per cent of the cases."'133 The Washington modi-
fication may produce significantly different behavior on the part of
clients and lawyers. If such a change were adtually accomplished, it
would not be easy. An informal poll among judges and lawyers in Michi-
gan, which has adopted a "breakdown of marriage" basis for dissolu-
tion (but has not expressly changed its statutory provisions relating to
division of property), disclosed that an overwhelming majority of
lawyers believed that fault will continue to be a factor in setting ancil-
lary relief. 134
4. Modification of Property Division and Maintenance
Section 17 of the Dissolution Act governs modification of orders for
support and maintenance as well as the finality of a court ordered di-
vision of property.' 35 The section begins by referring to Section 7(7),
thus reminding the reader that the parties can, by contract, largely
control the modification issues. 36 The section then provides for cases
not governed by contract of the parties.
As in prior Washington divorce law, a judicial property division is
(Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 32-616 (Supp. 1973); Tax. FAM. CODE § 3.01 (Supp.
1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-4(7) (Supp. 1973). An exception to this trend is
New Jersey. which has added voluntary separation as a no-fault ground but appears
to exclude fault as a factor in economic relief. N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:34-2. 23
(Supp. 1973-74).
132. California eliminates fault in division of property by an express provision of
the statute. Its statute provides for an equal division of community property. CAL.
('v. ConE §§ 4500--40 (West Supp. 1973). Florida. by express statutory provision.
permits adultery to be considered in deciding upon alimony. F.A. STAT. ANN. § 61.08
(Supp. 1973). Iowa does not make express statutory provision, but its court has said
that the admission of fault in connection with alimony or property division would
necessarily reintroduce the entire issue of relative fault and virtue for both parties and
thus defeat the objective of the new act. Therefore, Iowa does exclude evidence of
fault. In re the Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972): In re the
Marriage of Boyd. 200 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1972).
133. Hayes. California Divorce Reform: Parting is Sweeter Sorrow, 56 A.B.A..
660(1970).
134. Snyder. Divorce Michigan Style-1972 and Beyond, 50 MicH. ST. B.J. 740.
744(1971).
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170(Supp. 1973).
136. Id., § 26.09.070(7).
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final "unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the
reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state."'' 3 7 Finality of a
property award is familiar case law'3 8 and the Washington decisions
have articulated reasonably well what will, and what will not, support
collateral attack. :39
Prior case law concerning accrued alimony obligation is continued
in the Dissolution Act: Absent a provision to the contrary in a con-
tract or the decree, maintenance may be modified as to future install-
ments but not retroactively. 140 However, assuming that neither the
contract nor the decree provides otherwise, the remarriage of the
spouse receiving maintenance terminates the obligation. 14' This is a
change from Washington decisions which have not regarded remar-
riage of either the obligor 42 or the obligee 43 as an event automati-
cally terminating alimony. The Dissolution Act also provides that the
death of either spouse, unless contrary provision has been made, ends
the maintenance payments.' 4 This provision, however, is consistent
with prior Washington law.' 45
Il. PROBLEMS RELATED TO CHILDREN
A. Custody and Visitation
The last half of the Dissolution Act might properly be called a
"child protection statute." The changes are basic and permit custody
proceedings to be brought under novel circumstances and by people
137. Id., § 26.09.170. The prior Washington law. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110
1963). provided that "'the division of property shall be final and conclusive upon both
parties subject only to the right to appeal .... "
138. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin. 43 Wn. 2d 111. 260 P.2d 875 (1953).
139. Peste v. Peste. I Wn. App. 19. 459 P.2d 70 (1969): Rehak v. Rehak. I Wn.
App. 963. 465 P.2d 687 (1970): Peterson v. Peterson. 3 Wn. App. 374, 475 P.2d
576 (1970).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973) says maintenance "may be
modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification
and only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances." Once vested, the
claim for alimony payments has been considered a property interest of which the
obligee may not be deprived. Prior to the 1933 amendment. REst. REv. SrAr. ANN.
§ 988-2 (Supp. 1940). the Washington court did not have authority to modify even
the future payments of an alimony award. Blethen v. Blethen. 177 Wash. 431. 32
P.2d 543 (1934).
141. WASH. REv. CoDE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973).
142. Hanson v. Hanson. 47 Wn. 2d 439, 287 P.2d 879 (1955).
143. Fisch v. Marler. I Wn. 2d 698. 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
144. WASh. REV. CODE § 26.09.170(Supp. 1973).
145. Sutliff v. Harstad. 5 Wn. App. 539, 488 P.2d 288 (1971).
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who, previously, would have had no standing. Possibly the most dra-
matic change is in Section 11, which allows the child to be repre-
sented by separate counsel.14a 3 Judges in the past often appointed a
guardian ad litem to advise the court concerning the child's welfare,
but the guardian had neither a well defined nor a statutory position.
The child's right to be heard and presumably to present evidence and
to appeal is a significantly greater protection than that which could be
provided by a guardian. By this section a judge may obtain informa-
tion and argument which are not conditioned by the special interests
of the parents. Expenses of the representation may be assigned to the
spouses or, if they are indigents, may be charged against the county.
By statute, the child's attorney may speak to the issues of custody,
support and visitation.
The foregoing provision, together with other sections of the Disso-
lution Act, suggest a purposeful movement away from the philosophy
that parents "own" children and can be "deprived" of their rights only
by a showing of unfitness. The trend is toward a premise that the
child's welfare is more significant than the claim of parental rights.147
1. Initiating a Custody Prodeeding
A custody question arises naturally in conjunction with changes in
marital status, but under Section 18 (1) the proceeding may also be
initiated by a parent independently of a marital action. 4 8 This provi-
sion has obvious utility for separated parents.
146. A review of a new book, A. FREUD. J. GOLDSTEIN & A. SOLNET. BEYOND THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973). reviewed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1973, § 6 (Maga-
zine). at 70. 80. advances the argument that "a child is being deprived of his
rights in any legal proceedings concerned with his future unless he is represented by a
lawyer of his own who has no other goal than to determine what is the least harmful
alternative for his child client." It is not fanciful to contend that deprivation of
parents, support and a home without an opportunity to be heard is violative of due
process.
147. The shift away from a theory that parents have a property interest in their
children toward a test which emphasizes the performance of the parental responsibilities
is consistent with other portions of the Dissolution Act. It stresses what Chief Justice
Burger has called "an essentially contractual relationship, the parties to which have
legally enforceable rights and duties, with respect both to each other and to any
children born to thein." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. 633 (1972) (dissenting
opinion) (emphasis added).
Departure from the "status" concept of the parent-child relation also would pose
significant jurisdiction questions. See Stansbury. Custody and Maintenance Law Across
State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944); Stumberg, The Status of Children
in the Conofict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 42 (1940).
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.180(i)(a) (Supp. 1973).
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A feature of Section 18 which is entirely new to divorce law is that
a person other than a parent may begin a custody proceeding.149
Washington has awarded custody to a nonparent, usually a relative,'
as a means of serving the welfare of the child,'51 but such awards pre-
viously have been in the context of a marital status action. Nonpar-
ents who wished to present questions concerning children were re-
quired to resort to the juvenile court where the petitioner had to meet
a high burden of proof to obtain action.' 52 When a nonparent re-
quests custody under the Dissolution Act, he need only show that "nei-
ther parent is a suitable custodian."' 5 3 Even so, the test of unsuita-
bility is a greater hurdle than the standard of "the best interests of the
child" which, under Section 19, governs custody disputes between
parents.1'- By this gradually diminishing burden of proof, the Dissolu-
tion Act provides a scheme for balancing the child's needs with the
legitimate interests of the parents. Of course the parent or other cus-
todian must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 55
2. Criteria To Be Used
In determining the competing custody claims of parents, the Wash-
ington court repeatedly has said the governing test is the welfare of
the child. This is also the controlling criterion of the Dissolution Act.
although the exact words used in Section 19 are the best interests of
the child. What may be considered in determining "best interests" is of
149. Id., § 26.09.180() (b1.
150. Christian v. Christian. 45 Wn. 2d 387. 275 P.2d 422 (1954): Merkel v.
Merkel. 39 Wn. 2d 102. 234 P.2d 857 11951): Braun v. Braun. 31 Wn. 2d 468. 197
P.2d 442 (1948).
151. Fleck v. Fleck. 31 Wn. 2d 114. 195 P.2d 100 (1948). "Welfare" has not been
extended to include greater financial resources. Allen v. Allen. 28 Wn. 2d 219. 182
P.2d 23 (1947).
152. A typical case is Ex parte Day. 189 Wash. 368. 65 P.2d 1049 (1937). The
court says that the "right of the parent Ishould not bel abridged, save for the most
powerful reasons." Id. at 382. 65 P.2d at 1055.
153. WAshL Riz v. Coni: § 26.09.180l)(b) (Supp. 1973). In two recent Iowa
cases the custody of a child who was not shown to be either dependent or delinquent
and whose parents were not shown Unfit, was awarded to a custodian other than a
parent simply for the best interest of the child. Painter v. Bannister. 258 Iowa 1390.
140 N.W.2d 152 (1966) (grandparents refised to return a boy volntarily left with
them by the father after the death of the boy's mother): In re McDonald. 201 N.W.2d
447 (Iowa 1973) (removal of infants from parents who had a low intelligence quotient).
154. WAst. REV. COn- § 26.09.190(Supp. 1973).
155. Id., § 26.09.180(2). This has been the law in Washington. See In re Baum.
8 Wn. App. 337. 506 P.2d 323 (1973).
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co'tuse crffcial. Sedfidn 19(f) fmentions the wishes of the Parerit, a
common standard'.',f56 Subsection (2)! gives equal aftentioli' to the
wishes of the child, afiothef factor rdcognized by Washington cases.' 7
The' other Subsedtions of Section 19' relate to interaction among par-
ents and siblings, adjustmnrit to home and community and the mental
and physical health of all patties involved. 5 8 These factors are. com-
monpface in Washington decisions and are really inherent iii the "best°
interest" prindiple.' '59 '
A change in criteria may be required by a sentence in the. Dissolu-
tion Act dealing with faul . Se~fion 19' says that- ihe court shall not-
consider conduct- "that does, fhot affect the welfare of the 6hild."' 0
Previously Washington' cases regarded moral fitness, arfd especially
conduct related to sexual behavior, a- relevant aiid significant factor. "' '
The intent of Section 19 is that custody should n6t be denied
simply to punish a- parent for conduct whicl, while perhaps immoral,
will in no tangible way harm the child. This test is not easy to apply
HoweVer, the Washington court has awarded' custody in circumst-
ances w'hich appear consistent with the standard just- expressed." 2
156. Warnecke v. Warnecke. 2'8 Wm 2d 259. 182-,P.2d' 699 (1947).
157 Horen V. I-lore'ii, 73 WrX. 2d' 455. 438 P.-2d 857 (1968)' Presumal~ly the test
includes the established requirement that the' child is, "sufficiently mature td have
intelligent viedws and wishes on the s61ject.'" Nelson v. Ndls6i ;, 43' Wn. id, 2-78. 279-80,
260' P' 2d 886. 887 (1953). a' level' of mattlrfity which has, been' fouid as erly as age'
9. Habich v. Hfabicl . 44 Wn. 2d 19 '. 266'P.26'346( 1954)
158. WAsh'REv. CODE § 26.09:19'0(3)-(5) (Supp. f973).
159. The cases are too nui'nerou to cit . but factors which, have been' bnsidered.
With an illustrative holding.- include the following:
(I) Sex: preference of fiother for a girl., Horen v. Horen- .s h3rd note 1'5;
(2) parental' attitude toward child. Atkinson -V. A(tkisoi. 38 Wn. 2d' 769. 23 F
P.2d 641 (1951);
(3) mental' health of parent. Schultz v; Sc'ukltz. 66' W'fi'. 2d' 713. 404 P .-2d 987
(1965);.
(4) school opportunity and' cleai home. Lndbli' v. Lindblom. 2-2 Wn. 2d 291.
155 P.2d 790 (194'5);
(5) "tender years'" (recently of less importance)'- Patterson v.' Patterson. 51
Wn. 2d 162. 3'16 P.2d 902-( 1957).
160. This section is nearly the same as Sc(5i6n;4'62 F the UNI'FORM'rf MARRIAGE
AND DivoRcg AcT which,h'owevei. sftaes the test as 'conduct that does' not affect
his relationship to the child."
161'. Adultery does n'ot Alwa's prechde a Mav'fd of custody. Westlake v. Westlake.
52 W fi. 2d 77. 32-3 P.2d 8' t 19'8)-. R-ogees v.- ogefs- 25 Wn'-. 2d 369.. 170' P.-2d
859' 1946), but may d s4q~ahfy a parent when the behav or si of a' coti ig nature.-
Taylor v.- Taylor. i4 Wn. 2d 293:. 26 P.26' i 55' (f942' inolves a number ofdifferent partners. M'itchldl' '. M'jtchill. 24 Wni:. 26d70 1II. 166 P.2d1 93'8 I 19'46).162. Normai' V. Noan. 27 n'. 2d 2 ha 176 P.21 3'4 (194 c neermng' fi'
adultero fis m other, the co6iirt'said' ii wasg ni6i 6'on 'r~r'd -  ih b 'i ei i t' r.T he 4blestionis "wll sh'e take g'oodcad of the'fld&-/d."at' 27. 1'76~'dlat a: I
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3. Interviews and Expert Opinion
Gathering and evaluating reliable data for custody determinations
is difficult and the court usually needs all available assistance. Inter-
viewing the child is sometimes helpful and is permitted by Section 21
of the Dissolution Act. This section also settles some recurrent prob-
lems related to interviews: counsel may-not must-be present
during the interview and a record shall-not may-be made and it
shall become part of the record. Furthermore, the judge may ask a
professional child expert or other person for an opinion, but the ad-
vice shall be in writing and both the report and the expert shall be
available for examination upon request of counsel.1 6:3
In-depth, professional studies of the child or investigation of cus-
todial alternatives are expensive. Section 22 permits such investigation
to be ordered only when custody is contested or the study is requested
by a parent or by the child's custodian. Investigation of the child's
medical history requires the child's consent if he is 12 years old or
older. The results of such a study are available to all interested parties
and the right to cross-examine all persons is expressly provided." 4
Section 14 permits payment of "other professional fees" in addition
to the usual attorney's fees and court costs, 16 5 and Section 23 allows
the court to authorize travel and expense money for witnesses neces-
sary for a custody determination.'""
4. The Question of Visitation
Section 24 of the Dissolution Act continues the generous policy of
prior Washington law concerning visitation by a noncustodial spouse.
Visitation is to be denied only on a showing that it would endanger
the "physical, mental, or emotional health" of the child. Persons other
than parents may also be granted visitation rights. This feature, not in
the Uniform Act, makes a significant differentiation between parents
163. WASH. REV. (ODE § 26.09.210 (Supp. 1973).
164. Id., § 26.09.220.
165. Id., § 26.09.140.
166. Id., § 26.09.230. The first of these provisions has no counterpart in the
UNII ORNM MARRIAGE ANI DIVORCE A -r. It was added during legislative consideration
at the request of social work and counseling agencies. The second provision, a weakened
version of UNJFORM Acd § 406(b). was sought by lawyers who wanted a procedure
by which reimbursement of witnesses' costs could be assured before the money was
expended.
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and nonparents with regard to the evidence required to obtain a modi-
fication. Visitation permitted a nonparent may be changed in the
"best interests of the child" but a parent's visitation is not to be re-
stricted unless it would endanger the child's "physical, mental, or
emotional health."''t 7
5. Supervision and Modification of Custody
The difficulties concerning custody and visitation are prone to ap-
pear after the decree rather than before, often in such accusations as
that the custodial spouse is not caring for the child, is squandering
and misusing support money payments or is uncooperative in ar-
ranging visitations. The reflex action is a petition to modify. The Dis-
solution Act provides guidance.
Section 25 takes the helpful step of defining custodial prerogatives.
It also enables the court to order supervision by an "appropriate agen-
cy" when the need is shown. 168 The Dissolution Act makes clear, as
have the Washington cases, that the duty to pay support and the duty
to permit visitation are not mutually conditioned. 69
The Dissolution Act disfavors modification of custody, although
not nearly as vigorously as the section recommended by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws. 170 The Washington Act does attempt, in a
modest fashion, to discourage petitions. The judge may, under Section
26 (2), assess attorney's fees and court costs against the petitioner
when the court finds evidence of "bad faith."' 171 The petitioner must
also make a preliminary case by affidavit before a modification
hearing will be set.1 72
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (Supp. 1973).
168. id., § 26.09.250.
169. Corson v. Corson. 46 Wn. 2d 611. 283 P.2d 673 (1955). The rule is stated
expressly in WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.160 (Supp. 1973).
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260 (Supp. 1973) denies modification except upon
a showing of changed circumstances and after a showing that the prior custodian has
consented, or the child is living with petitioner uith consent of the custodian, or that
the danger to the child in the present arrangement outweighs the harm likely to be
caused by the change.
The UNIFORM AcT. § 409. prohibits any modification for a year after the initial
decree, and for two years after the first petition for modification, except in unusual
circumstances.
17 1. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260(2) (Supp. 1973).
172. This is required by WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.270 (Supp. 1973). The require-
ment also applies to a petition for temporary custody. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.200
(Supp. 1973) provides that a temporary order may be entered either after a heating
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B. Child Support 173
1. The Court's Jurisdiction
In any marital action involving parents of children, child support
may be appropriate ancillary relief. Normally, as indicated by Section
5 of the Dissolution Act, the order will be entered as a part of a decree
changing marital status, 174 but this may not be possible where in per-
sonam jurisdiction has not been obtained over one spouse. Therefore
Section 10 of the Act permits an independent child support pro-
ceeding. 175 Alternatively, the parents may wish to utilize Section 7 to
contract between themselves concerning child support, though this
contract serves only as a recommendation to the court.' 7" This does
not change prior support law in Washington.
However, there is at least one significant increase in the support ju-
risdiction of the court. The prior Divorce Act enabled the court to pro-
vide support for "the minor children of such marriage."'' 7 7 Two limi-
tations are apparent: The children must be minors, and they must be
children of the marriage being terminated. The second limitation is
continued by Section 10 of the Dissolution Act: The child must be "'of
the marriage."' 7 8 The practical effect of this is that some recognized
child support obligations cannot be enforced in proceedings under the
Dissolution Act. One obvious illustration is the support duty owed by
stepparents, 7 I and another is the obligation of a parent to support a
child born outside a marriage.' 8 °
or. if the motion and affidavit have been served on the other spouse as required and
no objection is raised, "solely on the basis of the affidavits."
173. Child support is covered by Wsi. Riv. Coti. § 26.09.100 (Supp. 1973).
§§ 26.09.180-280 deal with custody and visitation, but not with support.
174. Id., § 26.09.050.
175. Id., § 26.09.100.
176. Id., § 26.09.070.
177. WAsHi. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 ( 1963).
178. WASH. R Ev. CODE § 26.09.100 (Supp. 1973).
179. WASH. REv. CoDE, § 26.16.205 (Supp. 1973). ttmendinig WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.205 (Supp. 1972). The extension of support obligation to stepchildren was
made by amendment in 1969. The section was again amended in 1973. The section
had provided that the support obligation for stepchildren would "cease upon termina-
tion of the relationship of husband and wife." To this the legislature added "through
separation or divorce Isic] pursuant to the provisions of Ithe new dissolution actl."
180. Even though a divorce cannot directly provide for an illegitimate child, it
may recognize the need of the child and the state's interest that provision should be
made. thus in effect adjusting the obligations to accommodate support payments to
such child. See Heney v. Heney. 24 Wn. 2d 445, 165 P.2d 864 (1946). On the gen-
eral support duty owed an illegitimate child, see Gomez v. Perez. 409 U.S. 818 (1973).
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The other limitation upon the court's authority has been removed
by the Dissolution Act. The child need not be a minor. The age limita-
tion had caused difficulty. For example, the Washington court had
already decided that the parents of an adult incompetent -son must
provide for his support, but not because of any provision in the di-
vorce law.' 8 1 Since the age of majority in Washington was lowered to
18 years, 8 2 the difficulties resulting from the limitation have multi-
plied. This has been felt most keenly with regard to 18 year olds who,
while adults by law, had not yet graduated from school and who
needed further support. 8 3 The time seemed right to extend the court's
power in marital actions.
Under Section 10 of the Dissolution Act, support may be ordered
for "any child of the marriage dependent upon either or both spouses
.... 84 The test is now dependency, not minority. Since minority does
not limit the obligation, the criteria for support take on new signifi-
cance.
2. Criteria For Support
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act lists criteria to be consi-
dered in fixing child support, 85but Washington did not follow this
model. Section 10 of the Dissolution Act simply directs the court to
consider "all relevant factors but without regard to marital miscon-
duct."'' 8 6 The Washington court previously has stated that fault "is not
to be ignored" in fixing child support'87 and the new Dissolution Act,
in that particular, requires a change. Other traditional criteria found
State v. Tucker. 79 Wn. 2d 451. 486 P.2d 1072 (1971) and State v. Russell, 68 Wn.
2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966) and 73 Wn. 2d 903. 442 P.2d 988 (1968).
181. Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wn. 2d 390. 229 P.2d 333 (195 1).
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.010 (Supp. 1972).
183. Baker v. Baker. 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (Supp. 1973).
185. The factors suggested by § 309 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
are:
(I) IT] he financial resources of the child:
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his-educational
needs: and
(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (Supp. 1973).
187. Stacy v. Stacy, 68 Wn. 2d 573. 577.414 P.2d 791. 794 (1966).
413
Washington Law Review
in the Washington decisions appear to be consistent with the Dissolu-
tion Act and will undoubtedly be preserved. These factors focus pri-
marily upon the child's need and the respective financial ability of the
spouses.' 88 Interestingly enough, the Washington court has included
among relevant considerations the desire to "perpetuate for the
children . . .a standard of living in some degree compatible with that
provided them before the divorce."' 8: That aspiration is consistent
with the criteria of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act but is con-
trary to the prior Washington standard for determining alimony." °
3. Modification of the Order
No change from prior law is made with regard to modification of a
support order. Accrued amounts "are not subject to modification,"'"' 9
and the usual means of enforcement may not be denied.' :2 Of course
an order granting or terminating support, except for fixed obligations,
can be vacated by an appellate court,' ' 3 and the cases hint at offset-
ting credits under "special considerations of an equitable nature"
which are not yet well defined.'" 4 With reference to future support,
the Dissolution Act simply restates the well established rule that modi-
fications are possible "upon a showing of a substantial change of cir-
cumstances."'),
4. Termination of the Order
Washington decisions prior to 1973 held that termination of the
188. Garrett v. Garrett. 67 Wn. 2d 646. 409 P.2d 470 (1965): Gaidos v. Gaidos.
48 Wn. 2d 276. 293 P.2d 388(1956).
189. Puckett v. Puckett. 76 Wn. 2d 703. 706. 458 P.2d 556. 557-58 (1969).
190. See notes 128-29 and accompanying text .mtpra.
191. Starkey v. Starkey. 40 Wn. 2d 307. 313. 242 P.2d 1048. 1051 (1952). See
also Kain v. Kain. 51 Wn. 2d 387. 318 P.2d 955 (1957): Sanges v. Sanges. 44 Wn.
2d 35. 265 P.2d 278 (1953).
192. Pace v. Pace. 67 Wn. 2d 640. 409 P.2d 172 (1965): Corson v. Corson.
46Wn. 2d 611.283 P.2d 673 (1955).
193. Foutch v. Foutch, 69 Wn. 2d 595.419 P.2d 318 (1966).
194. Mathews v. Mathews. I Wn. App. 838. 843. 466 P.2d 208. 211 (1970).
citing French v. French. 74 Wn. 2d 708. 712. 446 P.2d 332. 334 (1968).
195. WasH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973). Corson v. Corson. sttpro note
192. discusses the case law pertaining to the change in circumstances required to
modify a support order.
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child's dependency suspended an order for support. 11( The Dissolution
Act, in Section 17, incorporates this case rule by stating that duty to
support is "terminated by emancipation of the child."'1'1' Emancipa-
tion, discussed briefly in the cases just cited, is not as clear a test as
one might desire. According to Washington decisions, emancipation
may be express, implied from conduct or a result of law.' 98 In many
emancipation cases the issue is whether the parents have relinquished
control of the child, not specifically whether a support duty contin-
ues.' : There is conflicting authority- as to whether emancipation
is automatic when the age of majority is reached.200 In Washington,
at least under the Dissolution Act, emancipation and age of majority
are not synonomous.
The termination of support "by death of the parent obligated" is a
continuation of prior law.2 0' Under Section 17 of the Dissolution Act,
termination by either emancipation or death of the obligor is auto-
matic unless "otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the
decree .... ,..02 Since the court's jurisdiction is no longer limited to
the period of the child's minority, the possibility of contractual ar-
rangements, and the use of trusts, insurance plans, and similar devices
should be facilitated.20 3 The cases reviewed above should persuasively
point out the advantages of long term contractual arrangements.
196. "Support is predicated upon the continued dependency of the children in
question." Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn. 2d 373, 374. 293 P.2d 759, 760 (1956). See
also Koon v. Koon, 50 Wn. 2d 577. 313 P.2d 360(1957).
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973).
198. American Products v. Villwock. 7 Wn. 2d 247. 109 P.2d 570 (1941); Riser
v. Riser, 7 Wn. App. 647. 501 P.2d 1063 (1972).
199. An interesting case from New York suggests that the parental duty of support
is conditioned upon obedience of the child. Roe v. Doe, 36 App. Div. 2d 162, 318
N.Y.S.2d 973 ( 197 1). This is questionable policy, but some authority exists that a parent
can emancipate a child by abandonment. Annot.. 165 A.L.R. 723, 727 (1946).
200. See H. CLARK. LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 8.3 (1968).
201. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn. 2d 454. 348 P.2d 225 (1960).
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973).
203. Under prior law the support liability could not be extended beyond the
child's minority and a trust or other provision for support could not be enforced after
the age of majority was reached. Sutherland v. Sutherland, 77 Wn. 2d 5. 459 P.2d
397 (1969): Mallen v. Mallen. 4 Wn. App. 185, 480 P.2d 219 (1971). But see Bauer
v. Bauer, 5 Wn. App. 781, 490 P.2d 1350 (1971) and Smith v. Smith. 4 Wn. App.
608, 484 P.2d 409 (1971), which permit enforcement of support beyond majority
when provided by a separation contract incorporated into a decree of divorce. It is
uncertain why the contract obligation was not lost by merger into the decree. See




Domestic relation matters should be handled differently from other
civil actions only for good cause. For this reason, Section 1(1) states:
"except as otherwise specifically provided herein, the practice in civil
action shall govern all proceedings under this chapter, except that trial
by jury is dispensed with."2 0 "t Certain variations from, or additions to,
usual practice merit mention.
A. Enforcement of Orders
Before 1973, Washington had developed impressive enforcement
procedures to be used in connection with alimony and support orders.
All of the usual debt collection processes were available, '2 5 and con-
tempt citations had been extended to what seems the maximum degree
permitted by the constitutional restriction prohibiting imprisonment
for debt.2 11 To these existing remedies the Dissolution Act has added an
administrative enforcement process probably unequaled in the nation.
Section 12 of the Dissolution Act makes available, at nominal cost, the
powerful mechanisms employed by the support and collection unit of
the Department of Social and Health Services..2 07 The statute also
enables one to enlist the aid of the clerk of court and if necessary, the
prosecuting attorney to maintain regularity of payments.2tt Section 13
provides an arrangement involving assignment of periodic earnings and
of trust income.2 (1° : Thus the obligee spouse and the child have a for-
midable array of enforcement options.
204. WsH. RI v. COoI § 26.09.010(f) (Supp. 1973). The phrase which dispenses
with trial by jury was added to the Dissolution Act by legislative amendment and does
not appear in the UNI ORM NI MSRRIAG Nt) DivoR(T AcT. Section 406(c) of the Uniform
Act (. Wasit. Ri:v. (out. § 26.09.230 (Stipp. 1973)) says the court without ajury shall
determine questions of law and fact. but that Section is probably limited to custody
proceedings.
205. See Swanson v. Graham. 27 Wn. 2d 590. 179 P.2d 288 (1947) for a discus-
sion of the use ofjudgment liens, garnishment, attachment and general execution.
206. Brantley v. Brantley. 54 Wn. 2d 717. 344 P.2d 731(1959): Decker v. Decker.
52 Wn. 2d 456. 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
207. W,%st. Rt v. CODE § 26.09.120 (1)(b) (Supp. 1973). The powers of the
Department of Social and Health Services are defined by Wast. REV. ('ODE chs. 74.20
and 74.20A (Supp. 1972). WASH. REV. CotE § 74.20.040 (Supp. 1972) authorizes
the Secretary of the Department to accept applications for support enforcement for
persons who are not recipients of public assistance.
208. WAsH. Riv. CODE § 26.09.120(2) (Supp. 1973).
209. Id., § 26.09.130.
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B. Costs and Fees
Section 14 of the Dissolution Act provides for costs and fees.210
Except for the amendment extending fees to professionals other than
lawyers and one other feature discussed below, the section simply res-
tates existing law. No attempt is made in the section to deal with the
question of indigency. 211 The prior divorce act of Washington had
two sections dealing with costs and fees, one for the trial and appeal
and the other for enforcement and modification proceedings. 212 In
part because of the community property laws, which, until recently,
gave the managerial powers almost exclusively to the husband, trial
expenses could be imposed only against him although expenses of
appeal and post divorce proceedings could be assessed against either
spouse. The new provision treats both spouses equally in all situa-
tions.2 13
The discretionary grant of power in Section 14, permitting an
appellate court to award costs or fees, is substantially identical to the
previous statutory provision.2 14 Therefore it should not disturb existing
case law permitting the superior court to hear the request for an
allowance even after an appeal has been taken.2 15
In Dille v. Dille,21 6 the court held that the statute authorizing fees
for a party could not justify an award directly to the attorney. Earlier,
however, the court had recognized that the party held the fee award as
210. Id., § 26.09.140.
211. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). held that "due process does
prohibit the State from denying. solely because of the inability to pay, access to its
courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriage." Given this
specific guidance, and in light of the general principles dealing with indigency. specific
provision in the Dissolution Act does not appear necessary.
212. WASh. REV. CODE§ 26.08.090..190(1963).
213. WASH. REV. CODE§ 26.09.140(Supp. 1973).
214. See note 212 supra.
215. In Bennett v. Bennett. 63 Wn. 2d 404. 387 P.2d 517 (1963). the court
reaffirmed its prior position that Rule on Appeal 15. defining the jurisdiction of the
appellate court, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the request for
fees and costs on appeal. A recent decision. Baker v. Baker. 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498
P.2d 315 (1972). again stated that allowance of appeal fees may be granted by the
trial court. The Baker decision cites Morgan v. Morgan. 59 Wn. 2d 639. 369 P.2d
516 (1962) and State ex rel. Atkinson v. Church, 37 Wn. 2d 814. 226 P.2d
862 (1951) which reach the same decision in construing WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 26.08.090 (1963). Baker also cites Malfait v. Malfait, 54 Wn. 2d 413. 341 P.2d 154
(1959) which bases the trial court's authority on WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.190 (1963).
Inasmuch as the Dissolution Act combines the prior two sections into one, the




a "dry trustee" and had no power to discharge the judgment obligor
until the obligee's attorney was paid.2 1 7 This judicial cue prompted
Section 14, which allows the award to be made to the attorney and
permits him to enforce it in his own name.2 18
C. Finality and Enforcement Pending Appeal
Washington has not had interlocutory decrees in marital actions
since the Divorce Act of 1949.2 " The trial court decree was final in
the sense that it would not be vacated by the abatement principle even
upon the death of a party pending appeal. 2211 This understanding of
finality is carried forward by Section 15 of the Dissolution Act.
2 2
'1
That section also provides that an appeal from some portions of the
trial court's decree, e.g., the property and custody awards, may be
taken without necessarily challenging the dissolution or decree of in-
validity.-2 2 Thus a party may safely remarry when he determines that
the scope of the appeal is so limited.
The prior divorce act also provided that "the trial court shall at all
times including the pendency of any appeal, have the power to grant
any and all restraining orders that may be necessary to protect the
parties and secure justice. -2 2 3 No comparable language appears in the
Dissolution Act. Does this mean that the decree is suspended or at
least becomes unenforceable by the trial court during appeal? Such a
result seems unlikely.
Years ago the Washington court stated that: "A proceeding on ap-
peal to reverse a judgment, where no supersedeas bond is given, is no
obstacle to the enforcement of the rights established by the judgment
appealed from .... "224 More recently, the court explained that even
if a trial court lost jurisdiction to change its decree pending an appeal,
217. Yoder v. Yoder. 105 Wash. 491. 178 P. 474(1919).
218. WASI. RI V. CODE § 26.09.140 (Supp. 1973).
219. Wxsii. Ri v. Comot § 26.08.110 (1963) provided for "a decree of full and
complete divorce ... final and conclusive upon the parties subject only to the right
of appeal as in civil cases... "
220. Jones v. Minc. 77 Wn. 2d 381. 462 P.2d 927 (1969). The rule that divorce
actions abate on the death of a party is stated in Osborne v. Osborne. 60 Wn. 2d 163.
372 P.2d 538 (1962).
221. W.xsi. Ri v. Comi § 26.09.150(Supp. 1973).
222. id.
223. W sii. Ri v. Cor- § 26.08.110 ( 1963).
224. Baisch v. Gibson. 138 Wash. 127. 130. 244 P. 259. 260 (1926).
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it still has enforcement powers "where an appealable order is not or
cannot be superseded. 225 The Bennett22 6 decision illustrates that even
though the appellate court may assume jurisdiction to modify or en-
force orders, it may also decline that responsibility and leave the task
to the trial court. Presumably portions of the decree in a marital ac-
tion, e.g., an order to dispose of property, can be superseded, in which
event the rules on appeal would govern.227
As already noted, Washington has not used interlocutory decrees in
divorce for nearly a quarter century. However, there undoubtedly are
persons who, having obtained an interlocutory decree prior to 1949,
have never returned to court for a final decree of divorce. Some of
those persons, even though not finally divorced, will have attempted
to contract subsequent marriages. It is for them that the court's power
to enter a final decree nunc pro tunc is important. 28 The legislature
wisely by amendment added Section 29 to the Dissolution Act and
thus continued this special power of the prior law.22 :
D. Venue
The venue for action on a contract is usually the residence of the
defendant2 30 while venue for an action dealing with a res, such as real
property, is the county where the subject matter is located.2 3' Wash-
ington's prior divorce law provided that venue for a divorce pro-
ceeding would be in the county where the plaintiff resided,232 thus
indicating acceptance of the traditional concept that divorce is the
225. Sewell v. Sewell, 28 Wn. 2d 394. 396-97. 184 P.2d 76, 77 (1947). The case
dealt with a custody order which the respondent refused to obey. contending that it
had been superseded. The court said: 'We do not agree with the contention that
such an order can be superseded on appeal.- hi. at 395. 184 P.2d at 76. Three judges
dissented.
226. See note 215 supra.
227. WASH. SuP. CT. RULES ON APPEAL 1-23; WASH. Cr. APP. RULES ON APPEAL
23. See also. on the point of appellate court jurisdiction. WASH. SUP. CT. RULES APPerAL
1-60 and 1-61 and WASH. C'r. APP. RU.ES ON APPEAL 60 and 61.
228. An interesting use of the ,un pro tztc statute is described in It re Kelley's
Estate. 310 P.2d 328 (Ore. 1956). There is an inherent judicial power to enter decrees
nunc pro tttnc. The inherent authority is "to make the record speak the truth, but not
to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken." State v. Ryan.
146 Wash. 114. 117. 261 P. 775. 776 (1927). See also Osborne v. Osborne. stupra
note 220. and Bruce v. Bruce. 48 Wn. 2d 635. 296 P.2d 310 (1956).
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.290 (Supp. 1973).
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.12.050 (1963).
231. Id.,§4.12.010.
232. Id., § 26.08.030.
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termination of a status-a res-rather than an action based upon
contract.2 3:3 Because the Dissolution Act emphasizes the contractual
aspect of marriage, it does not have a special venue section as the
prior Divorce Act did. Presumably the normal rules of civil practice
govern. It of course follows that if the respondent is not resident in
Washington, venue would, under Civil Rule 82(3), usually be in the
county in which the plaintiff resides.2 34
As introduced into the legislature, the Dissolution Act provided that
venue for custody actions brought independently of actions dealing
with the marriage should be initiated "in the county where the child
is permanently resident or where he is found."2 3 5 The legislature
added Section 28 to the Dissolution Act to provide venue for proceed-
ings to modify or enforce orders "in relation to the care, custody, con-
trol, support, or maintenance of the minor children . 2... ,,236 When the
custody issue is not ancillary to a petition for dissolution or for a dec-
laration of invalidity, the principal question before the court is the
child's interest and it is appropriate to place venue in the county of his
residence.
V. CONCLUSION
As originally introduced, H.B. 392 proposed amendment of the
marriage act as well as the divorce law. The reasons for this dual pro-
posal are stated in the following paragraph taken from the Prefatory
Note to the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.2 3 7
A review of the legal and nonlegal literature on marriage and di-
vorce suggests that, although the experts may be divided on other is-
sues, there is virtual unanimity as to the urgent need for basic reform
in both areas: not only of specific provisions but of the entire concep-
tual structure. The traditional conception of divorce based on fault has
been singled out particularly, both as an ineffective barrier to mar-
233. Schroeder v. Schroeder. 74 Wn. 2d 854. 447 P.2d 604 ( 1968).
234. WASH. St PER. C-r. (Civ.) R. 82(3).
235. WASH. REv. CoDE § 26.09.180(l)(Supp. 1973).
236. The references in this section to -'maintenance" and to "minor" children
are unfortunate. but presumably not significant. oversights.
Venue under WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.280 (Supp. 1973) is "where the minor
children are then residing, or in the county where the parent or other person who
has the care. custody. or control of the said children is then residing."
237. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVOR( E A( i at 4.
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riage dissolution which is regularly overcome by perjury, thus prom-
oting disrespect for the law and its processes, and as an unfortunate
device which adds to the bitterness and hostility of divorce proceed-
ings. In recent years, persistent demands for reform finally have been
heeded. Statutory reform has been accomplished in countries so di-
verse as England and Italy and in a number of American states as
well. Although less attention has been given to the anachronisms of
marriage law, the need for modernization of state regulatory patterns
in the light of a new approach to divorce is undeniable.
Late in the Washington legislative session, the original bill was di-
vided into Substitute H.B. 8, dealing with marriage, and Substitute
H.B. 392, the Dissolution Act. The dissolution proposal became law.
The other part of the task, perhaps the more significant and difficult
part, remains for future attention.
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